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Glossary
Important terms used in this report including terms relating to the level or type of
force used (e.g. non-physical force, intermediate force, extreme force, lethal
force etc) and terms which imply an evaluation of uses of force in terms of
concepts oflegality and skill (e.g. professional use of force, unnecessary force,
police brutality. (non occupational) police violence) are discussed in sections of
Chapter 3.
Administrative review - procedure entered into for purposes of reviewing aspects
of practise within an organisation. The procedure therefore is administrative (or
managerial) in nature being the responsibility of managers or supervisors and not
necessarily that of internal investigative or disciplinary staff. However this simply
means that it is open ended being concerned with understanding organisational
issues, identifying priorities and finding ways of tackling them. Administrative
review may therefore lead to legal or disciplinary measures being considered in
some circumstances, where these are 'he most appropriate way of dealing with a
problem .. but this need not be its main concern or purpose. However in practise
systems of administrative review may be fairly narrowly conceived and may purely
address a narrow range of issues, for instance being purely focussed on whether
actions are Jegal or not. The words administrative review are thus not always used
in this broad sense.
In this report force is distinguished from violence primarily in that the use of force
is an activity authorised by law while violence generally involves deliberate (or
criminally negligent) criminal acts. However where the term force, (and
sometimes the term violence), is used it does not necessarily imply that a final
legal judgement as to the legality of the actions referred to has been made. Thus
in discussing deaths as a result of police action, which are primarily the result of
police shootings, these are referred to as resulting from the use of force even
though some may be the result of unlawful actions. Note also that in the section in
Chapter 3 dealing with levels of force the report indicates that "force" (and
therefore violence) is not understood to include forms of non-physical force.
The words management of the use of force are understood to mean the
management of any systems which impact on how force is used by the police and
how the consequences of the use of force are dealt with. The focus of this report
i:: on systems which are internal to the SAPS.
The term misconduct has a narrower and a broader meaning. In the phrase police
crime and miscon: ,\,~t, the term refers to acts which amount to a breach of
disciplinary regulations but do not necessarily amount to criminal acts. This,
narrower meaning is the sense in which this word is generally used in this report.
In its broad sense the term is used to refer to both breaches of the criminal law and
of disciplinary regulations.
The words the police are understood as referring to the South African Police
Service (SAPS) and its major predecessor the South African Police (SAP).
The words police officer and member (of the police service) are here used
interchangeably and the words police officer are therefore in general not a
reference to rank. Officer rank is primarily of relevance in this report only to the
discussion of the investigation of shooting incidents in terms of Standing Order 251
(see inparticular Chapter 5, section 8). The duty officer whose responsibilities are
referred to in Chapter 5 is specifically of-officer rank. Where the term "officer"
is used in relation to rank this will be expressly indicated.
Proactive and reactive systems - within the SAPS the words "proactive" and
"reactive" have come to have a specific meaning referring respectively to crime
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prevention and law enforcement related activities. In this report these terms are
however used to refer to systems which in some ways contribute to the
management of the use of force. In general proactive systems are systems which
are involved in preparing members of the SAPS for potential situations where they
may be required to use force. Reactive systems are systems which deal with the
consequences of the use of force incidents. As will become apparent, certain
systems, such as the "helping professions" function in a way which can be
understood as both reactive and proactive.
In this report senior management in the SAPS is understood to be management
operating at the national 'andprovincial levels. Middle management is understood
as management operating at Area level as well as the commanders of police
stations and heads of specialised units. Line management is therefore understood
as management beneath the middle management level, for example the heads of
particular sections at police stations or in specialised units.
References to the transition are primarily references to the political transition
which in some ways can be dated as having started on February 2 1990 and
culminated in South Africa's first democratic election on 27 April 1994.
References to transformation in the context of the SAPS refer to an ongoing
process which can be seen to have been initiated in the early 1990s and is
concerned with the development of the SAPS into a police agency which is
constituted and provides its services in a manner appropriate to the democratic
developing country which is South Africa.
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Abbreviations used
rCD Independent Complaints Directorate
LTL force less than lethal force
POP Public Order Police
SAP South African Police
SAPS South African Police Service
SIR Shooting Incident Report
SO (SAPS) StandingOrder
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1. Policing and the mandate to use force
In modern societies the police are intended to serve as a central component of
government's, and society's, attempts to control and limit violence and crime. On
a general level the police engage with the task of dealing with the problem of crime
through activities such as responding to crime reports, investigation of crime, and
other activities, in part orientated towards crime prevention, such as patrol. Most
of the time while they are at work police are involved in activities such as driving
in cars or walking on the street, maintaining observation in one or other place,
speaking to or interviewing people and taking down statements or writing reports.
But a central thread that runs through police work is that it frequently "consists
of coping with problems in which force may have to be used" (Bittner, 1974,
pp.256). According to Bittner this is the common factor which links police
involvement in activities such as dealing with crime and violence with other
activities, which are not concerned with crime, such as dispersing a crowd
"hampering the rescue mission of an ambulance" (p. 249).
It is also a factor which helps to explain why, at the same time that they are
intended to be part of the solution to the problem of violence (distinguished from
the use of force by the fact that it is illegal) in society, police agencies appear
prone to becoming part of this problem. The SAPS, it can be argued, itself
contributes to the problem of violence in South African society. Of the high
number of people killed, injured and otherwise physically assaulted in South
Africa, some (the total number cannot be known) ate at the hands of members of
the SAPS. Many of these incidents are lawful police actions but many others (some
s
of which may nevertheless appear in official records as lawful police actions) are
not. 1
Another factor which, in addition to being linked to the police responsibility for
responding to crime, also amounts to a by-product of the capacity to use force, is
that members of police services may also be, disproportionately, victims of, often
fatal. violence. As public servants responsible for the use of force then, members
of the SAPS also need to be recognised as prone to the associated risks of
becoming perpetrators and victims of violence.
2. The managementof force: motivation
The use of force is therefore a component or characteristic of the work of the
police and it is therefore appropriate to ask how that use of force is manager I in any
police organisation. In the South African context there are three key reasons which
motivate that special attention be given to the issuer'
o Firstly South Africa is a society which is affected by high levels of
violence. The police are intended to serve as a key component of society's
efforts to tackle the problem of violent crime. In the sense that the use of
force by the police is of use to society in assisting in the control of violence
and crime it is then firstly a concern of managers in the police sector that
such force be used effectively. Where it is deemed lawful to arrest a
person. and where it is necessary for the police to use force in affecting
such an arrest, it is desirable that they should use such force effectively in
As will be discussed further in Chapter 2 it is not possible to quantify with allY degree of
exactnesswhat proportion of police actions involving the use of force ate lawful. In this report
itwill neverthelessbe assumedthat the majority ofthese uses offeree, and particularlyfataluses
of force. arc lawful, though aswill be argued, some situations of lawful use offorce nevertheless
amount to "unnecessary force".
These are discussed further in Chapter 2.
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order to achieve this purpose. A concern with improving the management
of the use of force is therefore firstly intended to ensure that, where it is
appropriate, force is used in an optimum manner.
• The second motivation for a focus on the management of the use of force
in South Africa is that there is evidence that an over reliance on the use of
force continues to be a significant characteristic of policing in South Africa.
While South Africa has adopted a Bill of Rights, many members of the
SAPS continue to conduct themselves in a manner contradictory to the
principles of South Africa's newly established democracy. Part of the
concern with improving the management of force is therefore to address
this inconsistency.
• The third reason for being concerned with the management of the use of
force in the SAPS relates to the need to improve the ability of SAPS
members to prevent and limit their own victimisation and traumatisation by
violence.
This "integrated focus" on improving the management of the use of force makes
sense for several reasons over and above those already outlined. Firstly it is to be
doubted that initiatives towards preventing violence by the police will win
credibility with members of the police service unless they are combined with
measures which are also intended to deal with the problems of victimisation of
SAPS members. Secondly the victimisation of police officers may be a factor
which feeds into problems of low morale in the service. If a concern is to improve
the effectiveness of the police, then it makes sense Lo tackle problems, such as the
victimisation of the police, which undermine morale.
).
Thirdly it appears reasonable to assume that forms of "victimisation" of SAPS
members may themselves feed into violence by SAPS members. Not only may high
levels of fear encourage an over- reliance on force but desensitisation may also
feed into brutality by members of the service. At the same time it appears plausible
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that police violence may contribute to increasing levels of violence against SAPS
members. Thus for instance a suspect who at some point has been brutalised by
members of the police service may be more likely to be able to justify the killing
of members of the service to him or her self. In addition, a suspect who believes
that if he is apprehended by the police he is likely to be tortured or killed may be
more likely to feel that it is justified to go to whatever lengths are necessary to
avoid being apprehended by the police. Where the police are known to be brutal
this may also discourage community members from assisting them. As Geller and
Tach remark,
"The dangers to officers in subsequent incidents might grow if suspects,
enraged or afraid due to stories they have heard about police brutality,
become "cop fighters", and if bystanders, who could assist an officer in
need (at least by calling .. for backup), decline to offer such help". (1996,
p. 315)
The police are therefore not necessarily simply part of the solution to the problem
of violence. Their actions may impact in diverse ways on the "culture" within
which violence takes place in society and may feed into societal cycles of violence.
Several pragmatic concerns can be seen then to reinforce what at base should be
a human concern to reduce levels of violence in society and, where possible, to
limit the impact of violence on its victims.
3. Structure of the report
In Chapter 2 this report examines in more detail factors - including the history of
police brutality, and violence by and against police, in South Africa - which
motivate for a focus on the management of the use of force, Chapter 3 discusses
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various concepts relevant to an analysis of the management of the use of force
including:
• General characteristics of the use of force .
e The situational occurrence of the use of force;
• Concepts relevant to describing the level or type of force used;
.. Concepts relevant to evaluating uses of force. In particular the report
distinguishes legal standards from professional standards, which address
issues relating to the skill with which force is used. Related to this
distinction, and central to the argument put forward in this report, is the
distinction between police brutality and unnecessary force
II The management of the use offorce - understood as taking place through
various systems which collectively serve to impact on how force is used
and how its consequnces are dealt with.
" The report identifies systems of administrative review as being particularly
appropriate in relation to the identified general characteristics of the use of
force. However systems of review need to address issues both of legal and
professional standards.
The research questions and methodology of the study are discussed in Chapter 4.
Ten systems through which force is managed in the SAPS, including systems of
review, are discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapte, ~ the report then lists a number of
key issues which need to be addressed in order for the management of the use of
force to be improved and puts forward a number of recommendations in this
regard. Chapter 7 makes some brief concluding comments focusing primarily on
the issue of review.
4. Key issues addressed
In summary then the research or which this report is based sought to:
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• Provide an overview of the SAPS as an organisation which is concerned
with the management of force by identifying and examining the operation
of the key systems within the organisation which impact on the use of
force; and
• Explore to what extent systems which can be said to provide for
"administrative review" of the use of force exist within the SAPS, their
strengths and limitations and the scope for improvement of such
mechanisms.
The report therefore evaluates the IIframework" for the management of force in the
3. It is hoped that the report may contribute to a process of improvement of
the management of the use of force in the SAPS which assists in:
.. Improving the capacity of members of the SAPS to use force in order to
enhance the effectiveness of the SAPS;
.. Preventing and reducing unnecessary force and violence by members of the
SAPS; and
Improving the safety of SAPS members.
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Chapter 2 Factors which motivate for a
concern about the use of force by
police in South Africa
1. South Africa's immediate history
The brutality oj the South African Police (SAP)
Prior to South Africa's transition to democracy (1990 - 1994) the then South
African Police (SAP) were widely associated with a heavy reliance on the use of
fore; and high levels of brutality. This brutality was largely directed against black
South Africans. Brewer points to statistics recording large numbers of people
killed and wounded by the SAP, and large amounts of money paid out in
compensati on inter alia for assaults and injuries as evidence which helps to explain
the SAP's "reputation for violence and brutality" (1994; p. 301). According to
Brogden and Shearing, during the years of apartheid the policing of the SAP
"ensured that sustained brutality" was a central feature of "black South African
experience" (1993. p. 16). In the words of Cawthra the SAP was characterised by
a" readiness to revert to the power of the gun". "Periodic political massacres" were
"but one retlection of this" the SAP being "equally trigger-happy in their day-to-
day operations" (1993, p. 2). According to Maduna, to the victims of the system,
the SAP wore the image of a repressive force" that shoots and kills at the drop of
a hat" (1993, p. 42).
As political violence in South Africa intens'fied (initially in the 1960s, but
particularly after the June 1976 uprising, and most notably in the period 1983 -
1988) sections of the SAP were increasingly drawn into forms of "counter-
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insurgency warfare, as developed by the U.S. in the arenas of Korea and
Vietnam". This involved extensive use of covert methods including assassinations
and 'dirty tricks' (Rauch and Marais, 1992, pp. 2-3). A particularly sinister aspect
of this period was the systematic use of torture by the police. While during the
time of apartheid expressions of concern about torture largely focussed on its use
against political detainees (see for example Foster, et ai, 1987) it also appears
reasonable to believe that torture was also widely used against non-political
criminal suspects (see Fernandez, 1991).
While much of the more recent literature dealing with policing in South Africa
provides examples of police brutality directed against political activists and people
involved in political protests it appears that violence amounted to a general habit
of conduct of members of the SAP. Arguably, police violence merely represented
a more organised form of a generalised racist violence which whites (and others
associated with the authority structure) targeted against black members of the
population.
Much of the literature emphasises the degree to which such violence was facilitated
by "an abundance of permissive rules and a protective legal system which has
produced a penal system of immunity" (Steytler, 1990, cited in Rauch 1992c, p.
3 .) In this regard Foster and Luyt point to instances where officers who had ill-
treated detainees "have not only escaped punishment, but have been promoted in
spite of their records" (1986, p. 311) At the same time it should be taken into
account that the formal value system of the SAP, which was based strongly on
Calvinistic religious doctrine, emphasised" a high standard of moral behaviour"
(Rauch, op cit p. 5) and placed a strong emphasis on rules and the law. What
remains unclear, is to what extent brutality was formally actively discouraged
within the SAP and to what extent factors such as legalism, Calvinistic morality,
and possibly a concept of policing standards, might have served to restrain the
police impulse towards violence.
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Whether it was due to the actions of the majority or a minority of SAP members,
and whether it was legally authorised and officially approved, unofficially
condoned, or whether it represented a deviation from and corruption of an ethos
which placed a strong emphasis on the law and high moral standards, the SAP
nevertheless carne to be seen as synonymous with a generalised reliance on
intimidation, bullying and undue violence.
The transition and establishment of the South African Police Service (SAPS)
The SAP was just one of 11 police agencies, all of which had a reputation for
brutality (Rauch, 1998, p. 2), which were eventually amalgamated into the South
African Police Service (SAPS) in the mid-1990s.3 During the key years of the
political transition these 11 agencies became the focus of efforts to "transform"
them into a single policing agency which would be equipped to provide tho type
of policing appropriate in a democratic society. This process of "rapid change"
(Rauch, 1998, p.2) was to some degree characterised by contestation between the
"old guard" police elite and those associated with the emerging democratic political
leadership, as well as by resistance from sections of the rank and file.
Nevertheless, by certain standards the process of transformation can be seen to
have been relatively successful. Initiatives intended to assist this process of
transformation were varied in nature but included (see Rauch, of cit):
• The creation of a new legal framework which provided inter alia for: the
creation of National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security.
These were intended as mechanisms for ensuring police accountability to
democratically elected National and Provincial governments;
The others were the police agencies 01' the four "independent homelands" and six "self-
governing" homelands. The process of amalgamation lasted overall extended periodbutcan seen
to have to some extent consolidated by the time ofthe passing of tile South African Police Service
Act in late 1995 (Rauch. 1998: pp. 1-2, also see Rauch, et al, 1994).
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a The creation of statutory Community-Police Forums (CPFs) intended as a
mechanism of direct police accountability to communities;
a The creation of a statutory Independent Complaints Directorate (leD)
intended to ensure that "complaints of alleged police crime and
misconduct" were effectively investigated;
.. Changing the symbols, including the rank system, uniform, insignia and
colouring of police vehicles;
• Efforts to improve the representation of black people and women within the
service and particularly the management echelon;
a A new approach to recruitment and baSICtraining;
II Initiatives intended to address the rift between the police and (black)
communities. This included the adoption by the police of "community
policing" as its operational philosophy and, as required by legislation, the
establishment of a Community Police Forum (CPF) at each police station.
But problems relating to the apparent propensity to violence of some members of
the SAP/SAPS did not simply evaporate. During the period in question there was
a continuation of the problem of brutality including continued use of torture,
unrestrained use of lethal force and deaths in custody in suspicious circumstances
(see Network of Independent Monitors, et al, 1995).
1t , oulu appear that while some of the initiatives might have had a positive impact
on the internal functioning of the service the mechanisms of control which were
established amounted primarily to external checks on the conduct of the police. It
appears fair to say that inadequate attention was paid to the internal machinery of
the organisation and to internal mechanisms of control. While for instance the
"new guard" derided the existing militaristic ethos and system of discipline within
the service, little emphasis was given to the development of a new framework for
the internal regulation of the organisation.
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While the tendency is to explain the apparent deterioration in police discipline and
increase in corruption in democratic South Africa as by-products of transition, it
would appear that these factors might to also be attributable to a neglect of issues
relating to these internal systems during the transitional process."
2. High levels of violent crime
What is also crucial. to note however is that the process of transformation of the
SAPS began, and continues to take place, against the back-drop of a severe
escalation of levels of crime and particularly violent crime in South Africa during
the 19908. While these increases in crime levels have not necessarilly continued
during the latter part of the 1990s this has merely meant that serious crime has
"stabilised" at disturbingly high levels.'
At th- .irne that efforts were being made to "transform" South Africa's
pre' brutal police service, South African society found itself relying on this
s Jice service as its first line of defence ;n combatting an upsurge in violent
Crath}.ality. While some emphasis was given to improving police conduct, for
instance through programmes of Human Rights education, a major facet of the
The issue of whether for instance discipline has deteriorated or corruption has increased is
inherently complex and not uncontroversial. It involves, for instance, a consideration of levels
of discipline and corruptionin all of tile 11 pre-democratic South African police services. Lodge
for instance notes that "pre-1994 police corruption is especially difficult to estimate" (1997, p.
9). At the very least it can nevertheless be said that issues of internal control relating to already
corrupt and ill disciplined police services were not adequately addressed ill the transitional
process (in relation to corruption in tile SAPS see also Syed and Bruce, 1998b) ..
Statistics on reported crime forthe period January to December 1998, attime of writing tile most
recent annual statistics available, record, inter alia, tile following numbers for cases of violent
crime against tile person: murder - 2+ 875; attempted murder - 29 418; assault with intent to
inflict grievous bodily haml- 234 056; common assault - 199313. The statistics quoted also
record disturbingly high levels of other violent crimes such as rape and robbery, not to mention
the host of other offences, some of which, such as "cruelty to o, ill-treatment of children"
incorporate clements of violence but most of which are distinguishable as property - orfinancial-
offences. (Crime Information Management Centre, 199" 'umexure A)
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transition was something of a decline in the operation of internal systems of
discipline within the police service. While issues of respect for Human Rights
began to be espoused within society and by the senior members of the service,
police on the ground found themselves pushed onto the front line relatively
unconstrained by formal systems of organisational restraint and control. A police
service which, in the recent past, had distinguished itself by its penchant for
violence was now called upon to serve as the agents of a newly democratised
society in fighting a wave of exceptionally violent crime. The available evidence
suggests that it responded in time honoured fashion.
3. Persons killed and injured as a result of uses of force by
members of the SAPS
Persons killed by members oj the SAPS
Discussing annual tlgures on persons killed by SAP during the years 1970 - 1984,
Foster and Luyt indicate that:
"If one examines the data in terms of five year cycles. the mean [annual]
death rates for the three cycles under scrutiny are: 1970 - 1974 = 84.2;
1975 -1979 = 170.2; 1980 - 1984 = 210" (1986. p. 304).6
Foster and Luyt point out that these figures imply that "the annual rate of deaths
due to police action has increased at a greater rate than either the population or the
police force" (ibid). The three cycles discussed by Foster and Luyt also exclude
I
the year 1985 when. they indicate. 798 people were recorded as killed by the
6 Sources for the data are given by Foster and Luyt as "annual surveys of the South African
Institute of Race Relations, and questions i:: trliament", The figures for the 197.'i - 1979 cycle
exclude those killed during the civil unresr c 1976 and 1977, while those for the 1980 - 1984-
cycle include persons v.r'ed in unrest during 1984 (1986, p. 303).
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police. The figure of798 represents an increase of 180% (178%) on the figure of
287 for the previous year 1984, which itself represented the highest recorded
figure tor any of the preceding years. 7
Subsequent to the advent of democracy in South Africa what have been the trends?
Table 1 attempts to estimate the number of people killed by members of the SAPS
using statistics provided by the Independent Complaints Directorate during the 30
month period 1 April 1997 to 30 September 1999.8
Prior to 198+ the highest figures were: 1983 (211); 1978 (203); 1976 (202); 1982 (199); and
1980 (178). As indicated in the previous note however the figures for 1'.'76 (202) and 1977 (149)
would have been significantly higher if deaths in civil unrest were included.
The figures in the table are derived from a November 1999 intemal SAPS report, based on lCD
statistics. by J Schnetler of the SAPS Research Centre. The computation in the third and fifth
columns is based 011 estimates that 95% of deaths as a result of police action are the result of uses
afforce by members of tile SAPS (the other 5% may include, for instance, vehicle accidents) and
that 12% of deaths ill custody arc the result of uses of'force by members of the SAPS. The
estimates are from a memorandum prepared by the Centre for thf\ Study of Violence and
Reconciliation on behalf of the rCD which was submitted to the Minister of Safety and Security
also in November 1999 and are based on Bruce (1998), Bruce and O'Malley (1999) and Dissel
and Ngubeni (1999).
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Table 1: Estimated number of persons killed as a result of uses of force
(lawful or unlawful) by members of the SAPS during the period
April 1997 - September 1998.
1 April 1 A1Jril 1April Total: Average
'97 - 31 '98 - 31 '99-30 30 per 12
March March Septem months month
1998 '99 ber period"
1999 (6
months)
Deaths as a result of 518 558 237 1313 525
police action as per ICD (458) (501) (202) (1161) (464)
statistics (shooting related
deaths in brackets)
Estimated deaths as a 492 530 225 1247 499
result of police action
resulting from use of
force (95% of deaths as a
result of police action)
Deaths in police custody 219 198 102 519 208
as pel' ICD statistics.
Estimated deaths in police 26 24 12 62 25
custody as a result of
police use of force (12%
of deaths in custody).
Estimated total deaths as a 518 554 237 1309 524
result of police use of
force.
9 Numbers arc rounded.
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According to Table 1 an average of 524 people were killed per 12 month period
by members of the SAPS during the April 1997 to September 1999 period. Current
statistics therefore indicate that:
• The rate of people killed by members of the SAPS exceeds that for people
killed by the SAP during the period 1970 - 1984. In fact the rate of 524
exceeds that of 210 for the 1980 - 1984 period by 150%;
.. The average rate exceeds that for peopJe killed in any year prior to 1985
and represents roughly 66% of the figure (798) for that year. 10
Tnterms of available statistics it would therefore appear that the number of people
killed by members of the SAPS is comparable with that during the worst years of
state repression under apartheid. However there is reason to doubt the advisability
of making such comparisons. Since April 1997 statistics on deaths in police
custody or as a result of police action have been collected and issued by the lCD
a statutory body which operates independently of the police. In terms of sub-
section 53(8) of the SAPS Act, (68 of 1995) the SAPS is required to notify the rCD
of each such death. Prior to the establishment of the rCD however all such
statistics were collected by the police themselves and issued either by the police or
government ministers. In the words of one of the people interviewed for this study
10 As far as the current writeris aware there are no statistics which are regarded as reliable estimates
of people killed by tile SAPS during the years 1986 to 1996 (see further Bruce and O'Malley,
1999, Appendix 1) 1The report of'the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRe) for instance,
based as it is on victim statements, does not appearto contain any systematic attempt to calculate
the number of people killed bymembers of the SAPS, or the security forces generally, during tile
period (1960 - 1994) which it was authorised to investigate. While no figures ate provided graphs
in volume three of'the report indicate that 1985 and 1986 were tile years in relatlonto which the
TRC received reports of the greatest number of killings (roughly SOO, and 450 respectively) by
members of the SAP. Of 13 90S killings recorded by the TRC during the years 1960 to 1994
roughly -I- 400 (32%) were attributed to the IFP, 2700 to the SAP (19%), 1 300 (9%) to the
African National Congress, 350 (3%)to the South African Defence Force, 300 (2%) to the
United Democratic Front and -: J ~2%) to tile Kwazulu Police, Roughly 3750 (27% of killings
are attributed to unknown perpetrators, It should be noted that the TRe report also provides
evidence of collusion between the SAP and Inkarha (later the Inkatha Freedom Party). The TRe
information indicates thatkillings by the IFP were at their highest levels during the 1990 to 199+
period (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998. p. 9).
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"the police are experts at controlling and manipulating statistics - they use this to
protect each other". There would appear no reason to assume that statistics on this
issue issued by the South African government during the 1970s and 1980s are to
be relied upon. IJ It would therefore appear unwise to attempt to make cpparently
authoritative comparisons between these respective periods on this issue.
Notwithstanding the above, the rate of these de, ",s appears high relative to
available statistics on such deaths during the apartheid "lod. Furthermore, while
ruralities recorded by the SAPS may be comparable with those recorded in some
US cities if one takes into account general levels of societal violence", "in ~
context of massive levels of societal violence the fact that police use of force is i",L
necessarily high relative to societal violence does not justify a lack of concern, Nor
does it necessarily imply that force, when it is used, is used appropriately,
effectively or justifiably" (Bruce and O'Malley, 1999, p. 56).
11 Furthermore the statistics cited by Foster and Luyt would presumably exclude deaths in
"independent homeland" areas. As indicated above - see footnote 6 - the statistics presented by
Foster and Luyt for 1976 and 1977 do not include persons killed ill civil unrest. The official
statistics presumably also exclude persons killed in detention, ussassinated, "disappeared", or
otherwise murdered ina covertmannerbypolice orothersecurity force members, practises which
we.e revealed to the Truthandkeconclllution Commission as nothavingbeenunccnunonduring
the period in question.
12 If it is 110t advisable to attempt to make comparisons between the number of persons killed by
members of the SAPS during the late. 1990s and numbers killed by the SAP during the days of
apartheid it may be possible to compare fatalities as a result of police action in South Africa with
such fatalities in other countries (see furtherBruce and O'Malley, 1999 though arguably 1110re
rigorous standards of statistical analysis are called for).
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Legality of fatal uses of force by members of the SAPS - shootings on and off
du»
SAPS data covering police shootings in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free
State during the 1996 ~1998 period provides the following indication regarding the
lawfulness of police shootings (Bruce and O'Malley, 1999, p. 31):13
• Of 4754 shootings 14% were evaluated as not legal in the shooting incident
reports. However in relation to fatal shootings the proportion evaluated to
be not lawful increases dramatically to 41 % (127 of 311 fatal incidents).
• When on-duty and off-duty fatal shooting incidents are compared the data
indicates that nearly 80 % (78 %) of fatal shootings which were evaluated
to be not lawful occured off duty. While 16% of on-duty fatal shootings (28
out of 178) were evaluated to be not lawful, 74% of off-duty shootings (99
out of 133) were evaluated to be not lawful. 14
The evaluation contained in shooting incident report is merely the initial evaluation
of the investigating duty officer and does not have the status of a court judgement.
Nevertheless this data provides grounds for the most serious concern about the
misuse by SAPS members of their firearms while off duty.
13 SAPS Standing Order 251 provide for all shootings involving members of the SAPS to be
investigated and the results of the investigation reported onina standardised fermat. The repor,
is merely the initial evaluation of the investigating police officer and does not have the status of
a legaljudgerucnt. The c~nduct ofthese investigations and the processing of the resulting reports
is discussed further in Chapter 5, Section 8.
l' Itmust be emphasised that the report from which this data is drawn is a draft report. The. report
notes that there appears to be some a level of duplication which particularly affects the data from
one of the three provinces from which the data is drawn. The figures should therefore not be
taken as authoritative. Nevertheless it is believed that the overall trends which they suggest can
be taken seriously.
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Persons injured as the result of uses of force by members of th» SAPS
Police uses of force, whether lawful or not, do 'lot usually result in fatalities.
SAPS data, covering police shootins in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free
State during the 1996 - 1998 period, suggests that the overall ratio of persons
killed to wounded in police shootings is in the region of 1:3 (see Bruce and
O'Malley, 1999, p. 21). Based on figure of 524 deaths per year as a result of
police uses of force (see Table 1) this suggests that during the same period the
number of persons seriously wounded as a result of police shootings and other
uses of force may have been in the region of 1572 per year. IS
4. Murders of members of the SAPS16
Members of the SAPS are not only perpetrators of violence but also
disproportionately suffer the consequences of violence. Thus on one level SAPS
members suffer excessively as the direct victims of violence. Over the last few
years for insta 'lce members of the SAPS have been murdered at a rate of roughly
20 per month (see Minnaar, 1998; Nel and Conradie 1998).17
IS If all firearm related wounds arc classified as serious. The figure would also include a minority
of serious woundings not caused by firearms but caused by e.g, other weapons or police dogs.
Estimating the number of persons suffering non serious wounds as a result of police uses offorce
requires a higher level of speculation.
16 A multi-disciplinary task team dealing with the attacks on and murder of police officers was
appointed by the Minister for Safety and Security in May 1999. The activities of the team have
to some extent been suspended pending the outcome of work being conducted by the research
sub-committee and is being managed by a directorate established in the Division Crime
Prevention.
17 Nel and Conradie provide a figure of 970 for the four year period 1994 - 1997 while Minnar
provides figure of 924 for the same period. The highest annual figure recorded by Nel and
Conradie is 265 in 1994 while Minnaar's highest figure is 254 in the same year, (This represents
a decrease on the figure of 280 recorded by Minnaar in 1993 - the highest number of murders of
SAPS members in any year in South Africa's recent history). The lowest figure in a single year
during the 1994- 1997 period, according to Nel and Conradie, is 221 while according to Minnaar
itis 211 in the same year.
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The one aspect that has emerged from the research conducted thus far is that the
overwhelming majority of these murders (roughly two-thirds) occur while
members are off duty. Thus an analysis of the alleged murder of 970 members of
the SAPS during the period 1994-1997 indicates that two-thirds of these deaths
(65.7%) occurred while the victim was off duty (Nel and Conradie, 1998, p.I).
However in so far as these murders occur in the ordinary performance of police
duties it may be assumed that a primary motive of the "killers" will be to evade
apprehension. Minnaar for instance indicates that roughly 32 % 0 f the murders (146
of 455 listed on p. 77) occurred in circumstances where police were for instance
"responding to a complaint, investigating a case, following up on information or
doing a search, apprehending a suspect" etc.(p. 68). Similarly Nel and Conradie
(Table 2, looking at the circumstances of 357 of these murders, is compiled from
data provided in their report) indicate that 27 % of murders on duty were by
suspects resisting arrest. In addition their figures indicate that "robbery from police
officials" (both on and off duty) is the single biggest "circumstance" associated
with these murders.
In general it would therefore appear that the primary explanation for these deaths
may therefore be found in the general factors which are currently contributing to
high levels of crime in South Africa.
23
Table 2: Circumstances of murder of357 police officers (Compiled from Nel
and Conradie, 1998)
Circum- On duty Off duty Combined (on and
stance off duty)
No % of 122 No % of 235 No %
Suspects 33 27 3 1.3 36 10.1
resisting
arrest
Robbery 33 26.2 60 25.5 93 2".1
from
police
official
Ambushes 7 5.7 4 1.7 11 3.1
Unexpecte 20 16.4 51 21.7 71 19.9
d attacks
Crime in 18 14.8 19 8.1 37 10.4
general
Argument 7 5.7 67 28.6 74 20.7
s
Love 3 2.5 13 5.5 16 4.5
triangles
Revenge 2 1.6 14 6 16 4.5
Unknown 0 0 3 1.3 3 0.9
TOTAL 123 99.9 234 99.7 357 100.2*
* Does not add up to 100 due to rounding
A key concern of the research conducted thus far has been to attempt to ascertain
the motives behind the attacks. In this regard initiatives towards engaging with
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these deaths have to some extent "stuck" on the question of, to what extent,
robbery of a firearm (usually the service pistol) is in fact the primary motive for
many of these attacks. However a possible limitation behind analyses conducted
thus far has been an attempt to analyse these murders in terms of a single "pure"
motive. Following Margarita (1980, cited in the Geller and Scott, 199J., p. 259)
it is possible to distinguish two broad categories of motives:
s Where the motive is "expressive" this implies that the killing is carried OUc,
for instance, as a direct expression of anger or hatred against the individual
police officer or police officers generally. While anger towards the
authorities - and the police as representatives of the authority structure -
has undoubtedly diminished since the change of government in 1994, one
can presume that there remains a significant sub-stratum in South African
society who carry forward an inheritance of hostility towards the police.
s Where the motive is "instrumental" the killing of the police officer is not
the primary objective. Rather the killing is carried out for some other
purpose. Thus where the motive of the killer is, for instance, to evade
apprehension or injury at the hands of the police, or to carry out a robbery,
this is in fact the primary purpose behind the killing.
It i., suggested that where police members are targeted, "expressive" attitudes may
feed into other crime related motives (evading apprehension or robbery), rather
than being the dominant factor. It is apparent that in a significant number of these
murders (18% or 83 of the 455 murders listed in Minnaar's table 7) the firearm of
the murdered member have been stolen. It may be suggested that, where police
members are in possession of firearms, and robbery of one kind or another is the
motive for an attack, this creates the need for the attacker to escalate the level of
violence in order to successfully carry out the attack. While "expressive" factors
may feed into the motivations of attackers it may therefore be the case that the
main effect of the possession of firearms by the police is to provide a motive for,
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and to escalate levels of violence againz; '~m, particularly in off- duty
circumstances.
What also needs to be examined, is the degree to which these murders are simply
a by product of the presence of firearms, associated with other factors such as
alcohol use, in the domestic and recreational life of police officers. According to
Nel and Conradie's report, 16% of the murdered police officials "had to some
degree been intoxicated when the murders occurred?" (p. 12). Furthermore 5.5%
of the inr;r1p"t~ vhich occurred off duty occurred in shebeens, 14.5 % occurred in
the hom, ,c members involved, and 10.6% at other homes (p. 21). As
indicated in Table 2 above explanations for the murders which occurred off duty
included "robbery" and "ambushes/unexpected attacks" (25.5 and 23.4 % of cases
respectively) but also "arguments" in28.6% of cases (compared to 5.7% on duty),
and "love triangles" in 5.5% of cases (compared to 2.5% on duty) (1998, pp.20-
21), Similarly a table compiled by Minnaar describing the circumstance of death
at 455 SAPS members during the same time period indicates that 33 % (150) of
these deaths occurred in what may have been domestic or recreational
circumstances (p. 77),19
Furthermore what may place a police officer at risk is his or her exposure to other
police officers, whether this is on duty or in domestic or recreational
circumstances. Thus, for instance, Nel and Conradie indicate that in 9.4 % of the
18 "In a further . 10of cases information was not available with regard to whether alcohol had
played a role or not",
19 If the categories "argument with colleague/fellow member of service" (54 deaths), "family
argument/dispute" (22), "fight argument with girlfriend/boyfriend" (13), "fight/argument with
member of the public" (34), "wedding/party" (2), "shebeen/tavern/nightclub/hotel" (22), and
"sporrs/entertainment event" (3) are combined the total is 150.
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385 murder -es in their sample "perpetrators were indicated as being other SAPS
members" t.l998, p. 16).20
White popular stereotypes assume the deaths of police officers to be "in the line
of duty" these deaths are therefore often not directly connected to their
occupational responsibilities. Overall then key factors which appear to currently
contribute to the high level of attacks on members of the SAPS could be seen to
include:
• General societal factors including high levels of crime and violence and the
easy availability of firearms;
• The persistence of a legacy, amongst a criminal sub-stratum of South
African society, of hostility towards the police;
" The carrying by SAPS members of firearms both on and off duty as a result
of which SAPS members are not only targeted by offenders but also,
through their access to firea .,d, tend to escalate confrontations in which
they are involved, whether these are in occupational, crime related or
domestic and recreational circumstances
• Neglect at a policy level and low levels of control at a management level,
within the SAPS, relating to members and their possession and use of
firearms while off duty.
20 Minnaar (1998, p.l 0) indicates that out of 924 cases where members of tile SAPS were murdered during the
four year period 1994-1997, the identity of tile attacker/perpetrator was known in 95 cases. Of these 95 the
attacker/perpetrator is indicated to have been a "c eagu'!/fellow member of the service" in 55 (6% of tile
total) cases.
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5. Other destructive consequences associated with tlre use af
force for members of the SAPS and others
Suicides of members of the SAPS
The SAPS has also been affected by a disturbingly high number of suicides of its
members. Statistics provided by the SAPS, for instance, indicate that 518 SAPS
members committed suicide during the three year period 1994 - 1996
(Correspondence from Crime Information Management Service, August 1997).
Explanations for the high level of these deaths need to take into account a range of
factors including for instance stresses associated with the transition (see e.g.
Sussman, 1998) but also the consequences of involvement in the use of force as
well as exposure to attacks and crime and its consequences more generally (see
for example Nel and Burgers, 1996). What has however been recognised
increasingly of late is the key role of the easy availability of service weapons in
these suicides. (See for instance Van Rensburg, 1998).
Families members, colleagues and friends as victims of police violence and
trauma
Not infrequently these suicides are preceded by the murder of an intimate partner
and/or a rival in a "love triangle" or other person, for instance ina brawl." In fact
it appears that as many as 25 - 30% of police suicides are preceded by the
wounding or killing of another person. (Liesl Rossouw, personal communication,
18 February 2000).
21 Sometimes the rival may be a fellow member of the SAPS. As indicated, according to Nel and
Ccnradie. -+ ~%of murders of SAPS members occur in"love triangles". In their study IO~I,)of
perpetrators of all murders analysed were fellow members of the SAPS.
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The wives or intimate partners of male police officers may also more generally be
disproportionately exposed to domestic violence (Nix, 1998). Thus the families,
friends (and colleagues) of police officers may run a relatively high risk of
exposure to incidents involving negligent, or other misuse, of force. In these
incidents including accidents, threatening behaviour, and violence, firearms
(usually service weapons) often playa significant role.
Psyc/Zological and medical consequences
High levels of generalised exposure to violence including i=volvement in the use
of force, combined with other stresses, do not only have an impact in terms of
suicide and violence by members but also in terms of factors frequently associated
with a deterioration in psychological and/or physical health. These factors might
include trauma, alcoholism, desensitisation as well as stress related diseases. Nel
and Burgers for instance point to the high number of medical boardings as being
one of the consequences of, inter alia, the exposure of SAPS members to high
levels of violence and other stresses (op cit, p. 18).
Firearm accidents
As indicated above family or friends of SAPS members may be exposed to a
relatively high risk of firearm accidents. SAPS members themselves may also be
the victim of such accidents. According to figures provided by the SAPS 82 SAPS
members died as a result offireatni accidents during the 1994 -1996 period, 23 on
duty and 59 off duty.
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Loss of firearms
Finally the possession by SAPS members of firearms contributes to the overall
problem of proliferation of illegal firearms in South Africa through these weapons
being lost by police officers or stolen from them. One set of figures for instance
is that SAPS members lost or had stolen or robbed from them 7261 firearms during
the period April 1990 to September 1995. (Gun Free South African & Network of
Independent Monitors, 1997).
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Chapter 3 Concepts relevant to analysing the
management of the use of force
1. General characteristics of situations involving the use of
force
Low visibility from a management perspective
It is a characteristic of the use of force that
"[tjhe actual decision to use force to enforce the law falls on the members
of the lowest level of the organisational structure. (Major City Chief
Administrators, 1991, p. 12)
In this respect it reflects the characteristics of police work more generally. In the
words of Reiner
"The dispersed character of routine uniformed or plain-clothes police work
[gives] it 'low visibility' from the point of view of police management or
any outside regulatory bodies" (1997, p. 1009)
Most police use of force therefore takes place incircumstances where managers are
not, and cannot be, present and involves a decision by a police officer that force
is justified or necessary in the circumstances.
t,
Unpredictability
The management of the use of force therefore involves management of a
discretionary activity which takes place in localities which are dispersed. These
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localities and the times at which the use afforce may occur are therefore to a large
degree unpredictable not only because incidents which justify the use of force are
themselves unpredictable but also for the related reasons that different persons who
are the focus of police action, and different police officers, evaluate and respond
to situations in different ways.
The use of force is also unpredictable in terms of its consequences both immediate
and long term. Thus it may sometimes lead to the arrest of a suspect or the
prevention of a crime. Itmay also lead to the injury or death of a person who may
be a suspect who was the original target of the use of force but may also be a
police officer or some other person. Potentially the use of force may also have
other consequences for a police officer including contributing to a sense of
excitement about, or pride in his or her work, destabilislng effects on his or her
mental health, recognition for skill or bravery, or disciplinary and/or criminal
charges.
(The myth oj) the split second syndrome
According to Geller and Toch
"[b]y focussing on officer decisions made prior to arriv a\ in the immediate
vicinity of the subject, trainers and analysts have begun over recent years
helpfully to debunk the myth of the 'split-second decision'" (1996, p. 312).
t,
Scharf and Binder (1983) for instance have "characterised five decision phases in
a potential or actual deadly force encounter:
• anticipation;
o entry and initial confrontation:
a dialogue and information exchange;
<I final frame decision; and
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.. aftermath'.
Geller and Scott (1992) "have pointed to another phase involving nonlethal tactics
between the dialogue/information exchange and final frame decision points". (both
cited in Geller and Tach p. 312). Police responses relating to situations relating
to the use of force therefore reflect a series of subjective judgements regarding
unfolding situations.
2. The purpose of the use of force
Arrest, defence and keeping the peace
According to Adams "police are most likely to use force when dealing with a
criminal suspect, especially those who are resisting arrest" (1999, p. 5). But when
the police use force this is not always for the purpose of arrest.
Most obviously a use of force will not primarily be directed at securing an arrest
in a situation where the police officer or another person is threatened with death
or injury. In such a situation the immedis 'purpose of the use of force is to disrupt
the course of action being taken by the person posing the threat, in such a way as
to prevent the loss of life or injury of the person threatened. In such a situation
while, while it may still be desirable that the person posing the threat be subjected
to arrest, this cannot reasonably be seen as the initial primary purpose of the use
of force which effectively amounts to an act of "private defence". 22
More generally, in practise, where they do respond to a call or come across an
incident in progress, the police hold a considerable degree of discretion in
22 Private defcn,:c is discussed further in the first section of Chapter 5.
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deciding how to deal with the situation. In particular where a "suspect" is present
at the scene when the police arrive, decisions which the police make relating to
arrest are likely to be influenced by a range of factors. These might include not
only the seriousness of the alleged offence and the available evidence, but also
factors such as the complainant's preference, the relational distance between the
complainant and suspect", the level of respect shown by the suspect, and other
factors such as race (see Black, 1971)24 and gender as well as "the beliefs,
expectations and self interest" (Walsh, 1986; p. 362) of the individual police
officer.
Potentially, in many situations the primary concern of the police will be to restore
the "peace" ("keep the peace", "restore public order") rather than to enforce the
law. The police may merely intervene to restore the peace, without arresting any
of the parties or pressing Charges. In other situations their presence may discourage
a person, on the verge of violence, from resorting to such violence. In certain
situations it may even appear prudent to subordinate considerations relating to
enforcing the law to these ofmaintaining public order. In the words of Morgan and
Newburn, "there are inevitably situations ill which the enforcement of the iaw is
oat compatible with the public peace" (1997; p. 83).25 Where a person is arrested
this is not simply because "d crime lias been committed" but because "police
officers are satisfied that a crime has probably been committed and because they
23 According to be Black "the probability of arrest is highest when the citizen adversaries have the
most distant social relationship to be one another i.e, when they are strangers (p. 341).
Black's study. in a US setting, concluded that race was not in fact one of the major explanatory
variables fbrvariations in pracuse relating to arrest. Another obvious factor would be likely to
be the demeanor and behaviour of the complainant. However, " piece in the June 20, 1999 New
York Times magazine demonstrates persuasively that mHIl,V,both black and wlere, US police
follow a practise of'vracial profiling" which would be likely to have consequences for the use of
force (Goldberg, 1999).
25 For example in dealing wi111HIlillegal demonstration "law enforcement" orientated responses
might increase the HIlger (' r 111ecrowd ami lead to a breakdown ill public order.
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deem it appropriate" to arrest (Morgan and Newburn, 1997, pp. 82-83. emphasis
in original).
The key point is that the police may often intervene, and therefore use force, in
situations without having decided that a crime has been committed or despite the
fact that they have no real intention of placing charges once they have pacified
those who are involved. The use of force might in many situations be primarily
directed towards restoring the peace rather than to arrest. Even where arrest
follows the use of force, this may depend on a subsequent decision, influenced
perhaps by the continued insubordination of one of the parties. 26
South Africa, as we know, is affected by high levels of crime. Therefore it might
be assumed that members of the SAPS, in so far as they may sometimes encounter
situations where they regard it as necessary to use force, often do so in situations
that are connected with crime. Furthermore, levels of serious crime may ulL.Oulage
the police to disregard 'less serious' problems. Nevertheless in general it can still
be said that where members of the SAPS use force this might be for anyone or a
combination of the following purposes:
.. Law enforcement (where the use of force is primarily directed to securing
an arrest):
..
Preventing threats either of injury or to human life;
Maintaining the peace or public order. 27
26 Of course even where there is some evidence that a crime has been committed, where an arrest
is carried out, whether or not involving the use of force, this might be followed by a decision not
to proceed with a matter against a particular individual.
27 These distinctions arc relevant to, for instance, SAPS baSICtraining" here emphasis is placed on
the distinction between armed orunarmed "suspects" . An example of a situation which may call
for police intervention is one where an armed person is involved in a fight with another person
who mayor may not be armed, The police, when they arrive, may know nothing about who
"started" the fight and therefore who is the aggressor The issue about whether the person is
armed unmanned is of course highly relevant Lut it is also useful to enable police to understand
that they may be required to mediate or use force in situations where the people that they are
dealing with arc not necessarily best understood as "suspects".
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As Bittner states "the duties of patrolmen are of a mind-boggling variety" and that
this "compels the stronger inference that no human problem exists, or is
imaginable, about which it could be said with finality that this certainly could not
become the proper business of the police'" (1974, p. 250). There are therefore a
range of other situations, too vast and ill defined, which might necessitate or
justify the use of non-lethal force by the police (the example of a crowd obstructing
an ambulance is given in the opening of Chapter 1). No effort will be made to list
the potential range of these situations here. 28
Crowds and the use offorce
One factor which should be noted as a significant variable in understanding the
situational occurrence of the use of force is the factor of the number of people
against whom the use of force might be directed, In South Africa, as in many other
countries, special policing units are created for the purpose of policing large public
gatherings and demonstrations. Thus the SAPS Act provides in Section 17 for the
establishment of a national public order policing unit. 29
In fact the idea, suggested by Morgan and Newburn, that situational factors may
sometimes motivate for law enforcement to be subordinated to considerations of
public order, is in explicitly acknowledged in the current Public Order Police
policy document. The document states that,
28 This discussion is possibly more relevant to the work of uniformed police than to detectives. For
detectives exposure to situations of the potential use of force is much more likely to occur in
situations of arrest overlapping somewhat with situations of defence of life or against injury,
29 The title should not be taken to imply that "public order" is the jurisdiction of the public order
policing unit. Rather the unit is primarily concerned with large scale threats or disruptions to
public order. Where such threats or disruptions are of a small scale, such as a fight ill a public
place, they are the responsibility of police generally.
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"According to the principle of situational appr opriateness, arresting people
at the scene is not always viable, as this could antagonise and aggravate the
crowd even further. One can proceed to the necessity of making arrests at
a later stage when the persons are isolated and away from the scene" (South
African Police Service, undated; p. 5).
3. Describing the level or type of force used
Physical vs non physical force
The question of what should and what should not be regarded as "force", in itself,
preser.is certain difficulties on a definitional level. One publication indicates that
the use of force "may range from a loud, vocal command to deadly force,
depending on the circumstances involved" (Major city Chief Administrators 1991,
ii). And that "many police training programmes teach a force 'continuum' that
starts with verbal commands and ends with deadly force" (p. 2). Similarly, another
text refers to police officers being "authorised to use both psychological and
physical force to apprehend criminals and solve crimes" indicating that
"psychological force or a show of authority can be a police presence, an order
(either verbal or visual), or some other form of coercion or deception used to gain
a suspect's compliance" (Alpert and Smith, 1994; p. 481).
"
"Loud, vocal commands", and even more softly spoken verbal commands or other
forms of non-physical force might achieve the same purpose as physical force
might achieve, for instance in encouraging a person to submit to arrest. Often a
situation where a "verbal command" is used will be one where this is combined
with physical force. A police officer might verbally threaten the use of physical
force or even implicitly do so by his or her actions, such as by raising a baton. As
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the police are seen to have authority, and are recognised as having the mandate and
capacity to use terce, any request or instruction from a police officer, or even
merely the presence of a police officer, may, in some way, be seen as coercive or
presenting a threat of force.
Such commands might also be used unnecessarily, or even in a manner which is
contrary to the law, such as where a police officer verbally abuses a person. A
police officer may therefore abuse his or her authority through the use of non-
physical force in the same way that he or she may abuse the use of physical force.
Thus, if force were to be defined ht terms of its potential consequences, or the
manner in which itmight be abused it might appear worthwhile to define "force"
as, for instance, allY act or form of activity that has the capacity to intimidate,
coerce or ensure compliance.
However, such a definition may in fact fail to capture what is in many ways the
quality of force (and of violence) that causes the greatest concern - its physical
nature and thus its capacity to cause physical, and sometimes even fatal, injury. At
a very basic level it would appear therefore that physical force needs to be
distinguished from non-physical force. This is particularly important because
measures which fall short of physical force may not only be seen as "non-physical
force" but if used skilfully may be used as a way of diminishing the need to use
physical force. Not only is non-physical force a form of the use of force, it is also
potentially an alternative to the use of physical force. 30
In tlus report therefore it is accepted that "force" includes physical and non-physical tenus. However the
terce (and violence) which will be focused on will overwhelmingly be that which is physical in nature.
NOll-physical force will therefore be seen primarily us an altemative to the use of'physical force.
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Levels of physical force
A second distinction is between different levels of physical force. Thus for instance
McEwen states that
"Law enforcement officers frequently encounter situations that require
some type of coercir e action or force, but not deadly force. Common
scenarios include dose encounters (e.g. breaking up bar fights and
intervening in domestic disputes), flights by suspects, hostage situations,
barricades and crowd control Officers clearly respond to many situations
whereLTL [less-than-lethal] force is the appropriate action". (1997, p. 40).
.. In fact it appears evident that Less-than-lethal force (henceforward LTL
force), while not necessarilly a day to day occurrence ofr all police, is far
more more common than lethal or deadly force." One American study,
covering 7 512 arrests, for instance, inter alia, found that (Garner and
Maxwell, 1999):
.. Their was some use of physical force or threat of physical force in 19% (1
418) of the arrests studied while actual physical force was used in 17% (1
283) of the incldents.P
.. "In almost 80% of all incidents involving physical force or threats afforce,
the most severe form of force used was a weaponless tactic; less than 12%
31 This typolog)' of force does not take into include forms of torture. Arguably rture can be
combined with lethal force in a category of "extreme force" representing the most severe forms
of violence which police have been known to use. However torture is excluded from this
typology. relevant to the management of the use offeree, which deals withforms of force which
m,l~ legitimately be used by police in appropriate circumstan-es. Sre further footnote 47.
32 The authors note that "handcuffing alone is not typically perceived as involving force"(p.33). In
57.3% ( -+ 3(5) of all the arrests the most forceful behavior by the police was handcuffmg (p.41).
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of the arrests which met our definition of the Physical Force Plus Threats
involved the use of a weapon" (p. 41).
CI In discussing whether weapons were used one of the questions raised is
what constitutes "use". Thus in relation to the use of handguns they ask
"Does a firearm have to be discharged to be 'used'?"(p. 30). In relation to
handguns they note that these were threatened; displayed or used by the
police in 204 arrests (or 2.75 of the total number) but merely "used" in 11
arrests (or 0.1 % of the total).
Weapons were used in 158 incidents. Those used most commonly were (in
some incidents more than one weapon was used): chemical sprays (56% of
the 158 incidents); flashlight (26%); dogs (13%); baton (10%); motor
vehicle (10%); handgun (7%); and rifle/shotgun (4%) 33
• In all the 1 092 arrests in which the most severe force used was a
weaponless tactic a total of 1 184 such tactics were used. Of the1l84
weaponless force tactics used the most common were: grab (50%), control
hold (19%), twist arm (8%); wrestle (8%), push/shove (7%) and hit/kick
(1.4%).
LTL force it would therefore appear most frequently involves no weapons but
sometimes could involve T~TLweapons such as batons and, as is tbe case in
countries such as the U.S., chemical sprays. However the distinction betweenLTL
and lethal forms of the use of force is far from watertight. In the US some police
departments are authorised to USea variety of electric-shock weapons. According
to an Amnesty International report "there have been several reported deaths
following the use of such weapons". These weapons have been used for the
,.
33 Note that in Chapter 2 the report indicated that vehicle related deaths (recorded as "deaths as a
result of police action" by the reO) were not being included in tile calculation of deaths as a
result of police use of force. There is however a strong argument that they should be. At the same
time one should bear in mind that many deaths may occur ir "ordinary" car accidents, and ill
discussing the police use of force, these would be distinguishec' from people killed by a motor
vehicle during a vehicle chase. (See further footnote 70).
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purposes oJ iorture in some countries while countries including Canada and most
West European countries have banned them for the purposes of law enforcement
(Amnesty International, 1998, p. 37). The use of weaponless tactics may also have
lethal consequences. "Suspects have also died from police choke holds, where
pressure is applied to the neck" with the consequence that some large US police
departments have banned the use of such holds (ibid, p. 34).
JUst as psychological tow' may be used as an alternative to physical force, it has
been suggested that improving the ability of police officers tc use LTL force (by,
for instance. improving their LTL weaponry) may assist in reducing the use of
lethal force, This appears to be both a consequence of the fact that effective use of
LTL force may diminish the need for lethal force, as welt as the fact that an
improved ability on the part of police officers to use LTL force increases their
ability to use appropriate levels of force and, therefore, appropriate restraint
Non- physical force, LTL force and lethal force therefore may be seen as different
"levels" in terms of their severity or seriousness, of the "continuum" of force.
Table 3 depicts non-physical force, LTL force, ar-d 'etnal force in terms of key
and general characteristics.
,.
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Table 3: Key types of force of escalating levels which constitute the
continuum of force'"
Type/leva Key quality
1
Generally associated with:
Non-
physical
force
Non physical in Usually understood as verbal in nature
nature. Referred to but may be accentuated through e.g.
by somne as demeanour, posture, level (e.g. large
."psychological
force" .
number of r alice officers attending) .
Physical acts which amount to threats of
physical force but fall short of actual
physical force may also fall into this
category.
Less than Physical in nature
lethal but unlikely to
force cause death or
serious injury
unless misused.
urvolves weaponless physical force or
LTL (or intermediate) weapons such as
batons (e.g. the tonfa); "sprays", and
water cannons. Handcuffs (and other
restr :'1t5) could also be in this category.~------~---------------,r-----.
Lethal Likely to cause
death or serious
physical injury.
force
Normally associated with the use of
firearms. Particularly aggressive uses
of weaponless force (such as certain
choke-holds) and batons may also have
potentially fatal consequences. The use of
police dogs in apprehending suspects may
also fall into this category though more
likely to cause serious injury than be
fatal.
34 Examples of several other approaches to classification of levels or types of force can be found
ill the 199'.1U.S. T' uutment of Justice report all the lise of force by police.
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Thus it bas been observed that "(m)any police training programs teach a force
"continuum" that starts with verbal commands and ends up with deadly force.
Officers can employ each level on this continuum as effective policing techniques.
They can also potentially misuse each level" (Major City Chief Administrators,
1991, p, 2). The essential information about any use of force incident is therefore
"not so much the strength of the level employed" (ibid) but if the level was
appropriate for the particular situation. This however requires a set of concepts by
means of which the appropriateness of the force used can be evaluated.
4. Evaluating the use of force
Legal vs professional standards
Literature on the police has traditionally distinguished between the use afforce ~
where members of a police service are acting within the law in fulfilment of their
responsibilities as police officers ~ and the use of excessive force frequently
referred to as police brutality 35. Thus police brutality is where a police officer
"chooses or intends to use force beyond what is reasonably necessary" (Alpert and
Smith, 1994, p. 1.89)and is therefore involved in conduct which is itself unlawful.
Itwould also include the criminally negligent use of force. What characterises this
"tradi.ional" approach is that it places an emphasis on the distinction between
lawful and unlawful uses of force by the police.
35 There are some objections to the term, Thus the Major City Chief Administrators argue "police brutality"
may be misleading, they suggest, 'lS "what mny have been present was individual brutality, not brutality by
the entire group of police in a community", The point is valid and it needs to be borne in mind in relation
to II discussion particularly of'unlawtul uses of force, which may occur even in police services which make
a concerted effort to discourage these types ofbchaviours.
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However what has been increasingly recognised in more recent years is a category
of unnecessary force which occurs when "well-meaning officers prove incapable
of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort
to force" (Fyfe, 1993, quoted in Alpert and Smith, 1994, p.489) 36
In fact as various analysts have argued the emphasis on a legal standard contributes
to an overall situation where the basic standards by which uses of force are
evaluated are set at an unacceptably low level. As Skolnick and Fyfe argue, the
criminal law may be a fairly inappropriate instrument for analysing issues of
professional skill and professional judgment.
"[T[he criminal law remains so broad and presents so many enforcement
problems that it cannot serve meaningfully as the parameters for any
professional's discretion. When we try to use crirniial law as a substitute
for standards that should be applied within a profession or occupation, we
almost invariably are disappointed with the results". (199~\, p. 197-198)
An approach to the evaluation of use of force incidents which focuses only on a
legal standard may therefore fail to recognise incidents of the use of force which
are lawful but which are not strictly necessary. In the words of earl Klockars "We
would tot find the behaviour of a physician, lawyer, engineer, teacher, or any
other professional acceptable merely because it was not criminal, civilly liable, or
scandalous, and it is preposterous that we continue to do so for police" (1996, p.
36
I
Unnecessary force may therefore reflect factors such as a lack of skill and/or training or for
instance that the police officer concerned is not, by temperament, well suited to this aspect of
police work. There may also be situations where force is used inappropriately as the result of an
error of judgement 011thcpart of a police officer who is acting in good faith and to the best of his
ability but otherwise in terms of'high professional standards. While unnecessary force is in theory
preventable through. for instance, improved selection or other procedures or through improved
training. not all inappropriate uses of force are thus preventable in so far as the possibility of
human error CU1Ul0tbe eliminated even in respect of the highly skilled police officer.
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8). In prac tise, Klockars says, the "traditional" approach implies that the only
standards applied to the evaluation of use of force incidents are those of the
criminal and civil law and, sometimes, of public scandal.
It is for these reasons that Klockars has motivated that excessive force should be
defined in terms of a professional rather than a legal standard.
"Excessive force should be defined as the use of force more than a highly
skilled police officer would find necessary to use in that particular
situation" .
Such a definition, he says,
"imposes the highest possible standard on the conduct of the police. It
leads to findings of excessive force far more frequently than any other
reasonable definition and does so in many instances where criminal, civil,
commonsense, and even less than expert police understandings would find
no excess whatsoever".
Inter alia, Klockars suggests that the value of art approach to evaluating the use of
force which emphasises skill is that,
"If police administrators wish to keep police officers in their employ from
use-of-force behaviour that is criminal, civilly liable, or scandalous, the
way to do so is to develop and require a standard of officer performance
that is so far above those minimal standards that, for all practical purposes,
police officers and police agencies need not be concerned with them"(p.
11).
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However Klockars emphasises that such a "new definition" of excessive force
requires "new mechanisms" (p. 12) which make it possible to "discover and
discuss the use of force freed from the threat or fear of punishment" (p. 19). This
calls for an "administrative apparatus" which "would work differently from a
mechanism designed tv discover criminal misconduct, unreasonable violence, or
behaviour that risks civi11iability or scandal" (p. 12).37
Non occupational violence
As indicated in Section 2 Incidents of unauthorised force which are of concern to
the police organisation may not only be those which occur during the performance
of police duties. In fact they may not be directly related to the occupational
responsibilities or r('~.!of the police officer and may occur in non-occupational
settings.
As was also suggested in Chapter 2 the point is also relevant to understanding the
circumstances of victimisation of members of the police service themselves. "The
presence of a gun in police officers' households also helps to explain high off-duty
victimisation rates for police officers. In Chicago, 20 percent of the off-duty
shootings of police by civilians involved officers shot during their own domestic
quarrels or other personal situations" (Geller and Karales referenced in Geller and
Scott, 1991, p. 461).
It must therefore be noted that the fact that the occupational role of the police
involves the use of force may not only be associated with problematic uses of
force in occupational settings, as well as with occupationally related problems of
high levels of victim isation, but also potentially with violence and victimisation in
37 The issue of an "administrative apparatus", concerned with the review of use offorce incidents,
is returned to below ill the discussion of administrative review.
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non-occupational roles and settings. Even while oft duty, members of the SAPS
'I . -, ually armed and are apparently expected to "place themselves on duty" if
they witness acts of criminality. This therefore means that they may potentially be
linked to incidents in non-occupational settings where they are involved in the use
of force. It also means that, while off duty, they may also be involved in incidents
of police brutality and exposure to victimisation which are related to their role as
police officers. Finally it may also mean that members of the police service are
p.. Iunlawful acts which are not related to their occupational responsibilities.
F .mple the victims may be their own family members rather than suspected
offenders. For the purpose of simplicity and clarity therefore a terminological
distinction will be drawn in this report between police brutality and non-
occupational police violence where:
• The term police brutality is used to refer to unlawful violence by the police
which is directly related to the police occupational role (for instance It
would usually be targeted at a suspect and/or involve the police officer in
making use of occupational power or authority, for instance, against a
person who fails to show respect for this authority);
e The term non-occupational police violence will be used to refer to unlawful
violence which is not directly related to the fulfilment of the occupational
role of a police officer. It will usually occur in non-occupational settings
(e.g. at home) but may also occur in occupational settings (e.g. police
officer shoots another police officer in charge office following argument
between them)."
The above distinctions arc not watertight. For example "authorised force", "unnecessary force",
and "police brutality" are distinguished from "non-occupational violence" to some extent in that
they are likely to be targeted at persons who, by reason of present or fanner conduct would often
be regarded as the "legitimate focus" of police work. However persons who are not police rna,
also leg.timately act agninstsuchotherpersons, particularly in self-defence and therefore upolice
officer who for instance acts in self defence while off duty need not necessarily "place himself
all duty". In terms of the terminology used here if he or she goes beyond the bounds of the law,
for example, his or her actions might either be "police brutality" or "police violence" depending
on whether he or she is regarded as having "placed" him or herself all duty or not.
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Preferred terminology
In summary then it is possible to distinguish between incidents of the use of force
or violence by members of a police service in terms of whether they represent:
.. A professional use of force - the police officer uses high standards of
professional judgement in evaluating the situation and uses force
accordingly.
• Unnecessary force - an experienced and skilled police officer would have
evaluated the situation differently and/or acted differently. Excessive force
in terms of a professional standard."
• Brutality - the act is criminally negligent or a deliberate violation of the
law which occurs while member concerned is acting in the police role, In
fact not necessarily lacking in technical skill but contradicts ethics of
professional policing. Excessive force in terms of legal standard,
II Non-occupational violence - the police officers act is a criminally
negligent or deliberate violation nf the law which occurs in circumstances
not related to the police role.
Appendix 1 sets out more systematically the similarities and differences between
these terms in relation to the characteristics of such incidents, their legality and
relationship to the occupational role,
-I
39 Note that lack of experience or skill may also result in a police officer, for example, failing to nse
force in circumstances where such force is appropriate. The category of "unnecessary fore ...."
could therefore be seen as part of a broader category of responses to situations of potential use
of force which lack professional judgement and skill.
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s. Structures and systems impacting on the use of force
In analysing the management of the use of force, one starting point might be that
there are diffe rent structures involved in the management of the use of force within
a police service. Their management responsibilities include ensuring that certain
internal systems are operating effectively and engaging with certain external role
players.
In an organisation such as the SAPS the management of the use of force occurs not
only through senior management (the National Commissioner and managers at the
provincial level), middle management (including area management as well as
station or units commanders) and junior managers (line managers and suprvisors
within stations and units) but also through the work of particular divisions of the
police service (e.g. the training division, personnel services, managements services
etc). Sometimes a particular system is not necessarily the sale responsibility of a
particular division or management level but the result of collaboration (to the
degree that it exists) between sections charged, for instance, with a training
function, and the efforts of middle managers and supervisors. For instance the
tasks of promoting organisational values, selection, training, or discipline depend
on different components of the SAP~ in order to function and are effectively" co-
managed".
The task of managing the use of force occurs not only through internal systems but
also through engaging with external structures and processes (e.g. the
constitutional and law courts, government, the Independent Complaints
Directorate, the media)."
In this paper the focus is on "internal mechanisms". This obviously raises questions about other
mechanisms, most notably the Ministry/Secretariatand Independent Complaints Directorate and
whether they should also not be regarded as mechanisms for managing the use of force. The
approach taken here is that they can be seen as meclnnisms which have the potential to impact
on the managem. 'nt of force but are not part of the f PS management system. In particular the
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In Table 4 an attempt has been to depict the relationship between the different
levels and types of management structure within the SAPS and some of the
systems relevant to the management of the use of force.
o
lCD's obligation to investigate all deaths "as a result of police action" (some deaths "in police
custody" may also be the result of uses of force), as well as its broader concern with alleged
police crime and misconduct, implies that it can potentially be regarded as a quasi internal
mechanism in terms of its potential contribution to the management of the use of force (see
footnote 46).
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Table 4 Rough schematic representation of relationship between
management structures and systems relevant to the use of force as
currently operational within the SAPS (if indicates key level(s) at
which system is managed.
INTERNAL SAPS STRUCTURES
SYSTEMS
IMPACTING uN
Senior man- Divisions Middle Line man-
THE USE OF
agement man- agement
FORCE
agement and
supervisors
Developing ./ ./
regulatory framework
Defining ami ./ ./ ./ ./
promoting
organisational values
Selection ./
Training ./ ./ ./
Control of firearms ./
Operational ./
command
Review of use of ./ ./
force
Debriefing and other ./
support
Discipline
,.
./
There are therefore a range of systems within the police organisation which can be
seen as part of the management of force. These systems are not necessarily focused
on managing the use of force. Thus for instance the broad system of operational
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command is concerned with a range of issues to do with deployment and crime
control and is in many ways relatively unconcerned with [he use of force. However
certain systems, and particular aspects of certain systems, are focused on issues
relating to the use of force. ~ or instance certain policies and procedures,
components of basic and advanced training, and for instance mental health
promotion activities, are focussed directly on aspects of the use of force.
Understanding how the management of the 1.1S>.: of force within the SAPS operates
is therefore a potentially complex task involving an examination of the interp. J.y
between a range of structures in operationalising various systems."
6. Administrative review
Forms of administrative review
The use of force, though it is itself constituted by "banal" acts of apparent violence
is :.nmany ways a complex activity for a police organisation to come to terms with
and manage effectively and is managed through a diverse range of mechanisms.
Ultimately however as indicated, while there are some "proact ve" measures, such
as selection and training, which can impact on how force is used, situations where
force may be required mostly cannot be predicted and when they occur take place
in situations of low visibility from a managerial point of view. The management
of the use of force therefore to some extent necessarily involvec an after the face
response to police actions. Police managers are therefore compelled to rely on
systems which attempt to evaluate the use of force retrospectively. Such systems,
which can be regarded as forms of administrative review, fall broadly into two
categories:
41 In Chapter 5 the report examines the operation often key systems within the SAPS which in one
way or another serve as mechanisms for the management of the use of force within the SAPS
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(a) Incident investigation
Where police members are involved in shooting incidents (and rarely it would
appear in relation to other uses of force) many police org misations require that an
investigation be conducted into the incident. .
(b) Trend identification and evaluation
Trend identification could for instance include an analysis of "Written use of force
reports; Citizen complaints; Supervisory observation; Peer observation; Media
inquiries; Problems experienced by family and friends; Behavioural indicators
including sick leave abuse, alcohol abuse, marital problems aI'J others; Critical
incident stress inducers and other officer stress factors. The evaluation process
might include: Staff review; Outside professional assistance; Advisory committees
(Major City Chief Administrators, 1991, p. 42).
The two types of review are therefore quite different with the one focussing on
individual incidents while the other involves a review of general data relating to
the involvement of police officers in the use of force. Nevertheless what is often
the common factor in these systems is that they "focus primarily on criminal and
other grossly substandard officer misbehaviour that merits punitive responses".
But, as Geller and Tech argue, "little progress will be made in upgrading the skill
with which police decide whether to use force, what type afforce, and how much
force to use, until we broaden administrative inquiries and other interventions".
(1996, p. 293)
Broadening administrative enquiries - supervisory incident investigation
According to Klockars the type of system of review that can be most effective
depends first of all on defining "excessive force as more force than a highly skilled
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police officer would find necessary to use in a given situation'' (1996, p. 12).
Thereafter it is possible to "configure an administrative control apparatus that is
specifically designed to respond to that definition. Such an administrative apparatus
would work differently from a mechanism designed to discover and control
criminal misconduct, unreasonable violence, or behaviour that risks civil liability
or scandal" (1996, p. 12). In order to be effective it should be composed of two
parts" [a] policy, goal or objective, and an organisational apparatus through which
to realise it" .
• The statement of policy which he proposes is simply that "police officers
shall work in ways that minimise the use afforce".
It The organisational apparatus, he suggests, must at minimum "do three
things: monitor the use of force, evaluate the skill with which it is used,
and educate officers in its skilled use" (p. 12).
The approach which Klockars suggests therefore uses a standard which is defined
in police agency policy rather than a legal standard with the emphasis being on
evaluating issues of skill. His proposal is effectively for a form of incident
investigation which focuses on whether the incident represents an appropriate use
offorce or whether the use offorce could have been avoided (or reduced in level)
by more skilful policing. Furthermore, rather than disciplinary measures, where
the investigation points to shortcomings in skill the emphasis should be on
education of the individual officer concerned. As Klockars describes it -12
This quote is from 11 transcription of 11 telephonic conference which was held on the 22 April
1999. The telephonic conference was organised by the United States Information Service and the
question; were put forward by researchers from the Centre fer the Study of Violence and
Reconcillation and the Policing Prograrnme at the School of Public and Development
Manuge.nent at the University of the Witwatersrand. The transcription is by Susan Chung.
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"On each occasion on which you have a police use of force", you write a
use of force report. And at the end of that report, the immediate supervisor
of the officer reaches one of three conclusions. The use of force Was
justified and appropriate - tine, no further problem; The use of force was
a violation of the agency policy - it was wrong, and you refer thu for
further investigation to internal affairs; Or the use of force was consistent
wi th agency policy, but an alternative approach would have been desirable,
one which might have avoided the use of force, And it's that third option
that you want officers to consider. You want a supervisor to look at that,
use that supervisor's skill and history in policing and say: "Is there a way
that this could have been handled better?" You don't punish the officer
whom you find in this case. You simply say this is the way it could have
been done. If that sergeant can't find that "way" that report then goes up
to a lieutenant. The lieutenant reads the case and says, wait a minute, it
didn't have to happen this way - that police officer could have handled it
this way. So that lieutenant then turns it back down to the sergeant and
officer and says, this whole thing could have been avoided if you did X, Y,
and ZIt.
The approach put forward by Klockars therefore puts initial responsibility for the
evaluation of use of force incidents in the hands of first line supervisors, building
in a process of evaluation and criticism into the day to day management of the use
of force. One of the strengths of the model put forward by Klockars is therefore
that it provides those who interact on a flay to day basis with police officers with
43 In his article 011 the issue Klockars proposes "two rules to govern when a low-level use of force
that does not produce injury should be reported: whenever anyone gives any indication or
suggestion of any dissatisfaction with the officer's use of force, or any occasion on which any
officer involved in the incident believ '5 for any reason that a use-of-force report would be
desirable. Both rules are admittedly imperfect but extend the scope of force monitoring beyond
instances causing injury" (1996, p. 14).
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a tool which enables them to become involved in the management of how force is
used.
Identifying possible problem officers
Where police officers are involved in the use of force their actions are based on
subjective judgements made in unfolding situations. These situations may be
difficult to recreate. Systems of incident investigation are necessary to evaluate the
conduct of officers in these situations particularly whether the issues being
addressed are ones of legality or skill.
But the investigation of individual incidents does not necessarily provide
indications as to the general behaviour of a police officer. As Tach says there are
"officers who are involved in difficulties more frequently than on would expect..
Such officers would be sud to manifest a propensity to use force, and one could
predict that they would continue to manifest this propensity" (1996, pp 95 - 96)
While an effective system of incident investigation may render the need for such
analysis superfluous, particularly where there are, for instance, high levels of
complaints against officers such systems may demonstrate their value. This may
particularly be the case where the officers in question are involved in attempts to
conceal or cover-up acts of brutality. "Charges of resisting arrest (or of assault on
officers) may be frequently filed to "cover" or try to justify excessive uses of
force. The practise is prevalent across agencies, and repeated filing of charges of
resisting arrest can be a reliable indicator of excessive use of force by individual
oft1cers" (Tach, op cit, pl04).
Trend analysis therefore might involve the analysis of one or more data sources
and be conducted by police managers rather than the immediate supervisors of
those police officers involved in the use of force. This may be particularly useful
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where there is some level of reluctance on the part of supervisors to expose or
reprimand officers involved in brutality.
Potentially then both supervisory incident investigation and trend analysis may be
of value and would serve to supplement or enhance th- management of the use of
force."
Systems of review currently in use within the SAPS are discussed in Section 8 of Chapter 5. TIle
issue of problem officers is discussed further in Sections 9 and 10 of Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4~ Research questions, methodology
and limitations
1. Research questions
The study therefore focuses on examining a number of questions which relate to
two broad issues:
I Key systemswithin the SAPSwhich impact on the use of force
(a) What are the major components or systems within the SAPS which are
concerned with the management of the use of force?
(b) What impact does the operation of these systems have on the way in which
force is managed within the SAPS?
(c) What are the key issues in terms of improving the management of the use
of force in the SAPS?
II Administrative review
(d) What use is made within the SAPS of systems of administrative review of
the use of force?
(e) To what extent may improved mechanisms of administrative review
contribute to improving the effectiveness of systems for the management
of the use of force?
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2. Methodology
Initial access
The initial work on this report was conducted as part of a broader research project,
conducted on behalf of the Independent Complaints Directorate, for which
approval was granted by the SAPS Divisional Commissioner, Management
Services in November 1998. Permission for continuation of the research was
granted by the Divisional Commissioner in January 2000.
The research programme
The research programme combined the following components: review of literature,
legislation and SAPS regulations; interviews; an e-mail survey of Area
Commissioner's offices.
The review of literature included local and international sources relating to issues
covered in this report. The literature review draws extensively from the US
literature on the subject. It would appear that the United States is the country
where issues to do with the use of force and control thereof have been analysed
most extensively. Furthermore policing in the US is characterised by relatively
extensive firearm usage with the consequence that, unlike many other English
speaking developed countries, issues faced there bear a strong resemblance to those
being faced in South Africa. 45
45 Itwould appearthatthe intemationalhteratnre onpolice use offeree outside the developed world
is not particularly sophisticated or extensive. Outside South Africa the best examples appear to
be studies of policing particularly m Brazil (e.g, Cano, 1997; Human rights Watch/Americas,
1997) as well as Chevigny's book (1995) which covers police violence in NortL Central and
South America and the Caribbean.
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The interview programme consisted of 15 interviews (A list of the interviews is
provided inAppendix 2):
• Eight interviews were with SAPS Senior and Divisional Management
(indicated in Appendix 2 as organisational level 1): At national level these
included representatives of the SAPS psychological services, the negative
discipline section, the multi-disciplinary task team dealing with attacks on
police officers, the Public Order Police Development Services, the SAPS
Research Centre, the training division and the SAPS training college. At
provincial level one interview was conducted with a representative of the
legal services division.
.. Five interviews were with SAPS "mid-level" managers (organisation level
2): These included two station commanders and the head of a specialised
reaction unit, a representative of legal services in one area and the head of
negative discipline in another.
" Two interviews were with SAPS members involved in a line management
function (organisation level 3). The interviews involved a recently
resigned former member of the SAP and SAPS with a total of 14 years
experience and the head of the cm at a police station.
The report attempts to reflect the complexity of the SAPS and therefore the
interviewees are drawn from the three identified "levels" of till" rrganisation.
Interviewees were however selected and identified while the research was in
progress. In identifying interviewees emphasis was given to selecting SAPS
members who would have in depth experience of the management of the use of
force within the SAPS. In terms of number of interviews the coverage which was
given to different "systems" therefore depended partly on an evaluation as to its
relative importance in terms of the management of the use of force. Thereafter
consideration was also given to whether it appeared that the area had been
adequately covered. For example the interview with psychological services
appeared to have dealt with the role of the helping professions fairly
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comprehensively. It was therefore decided that interviews with other
representatives of the helping professions would not be a priority.
An additional operating assumption, which was confirmed by the research, was
that managers at the middle level (the area level as well as station and unit
commanders) could be identified as the "key" level of the management of the use
of force and this level was therefore prioritised not only through the interviews
(one third of the interviews were conducted at this level) but also through the e-
mail survey. In this respect a modest effort was made to ret1ect some level of the
diversity of the conditions under which policing if;conducted in South Africa. Thus
the station commanders and line managers interviewed included representatives of
diverse stations including ones s, rated in a relatively aftluent area and others
situated in areas regarded as particularly dangerous lor SAPS members.
Potential interviewees were to some extent identified on the basis of the station or
unit at which they were based but also through the advice of informal sources with
respect to SAPS managers who might be "good people to talk to". This form of
selection may mean that many of the interviewees were in some ways relatively
exceptional as managers and, where their practises are ret1ected in this report, this
may mean that the report is in some ways biassed towards examples of good
practise rather than being representative of the general state of affairs within the
SAPS.
Interviews were semi-structured and of an exploratory nature. Each interview was
focussed on the area of specialisation of the interviewee and therefore did not
follow a consistent format. Prior to the first five interviews rough sets of themes
was identified before each interview. Thereafter a standard list of themes was
developed (see Appendix 3) as an interview guide. Prior to each interview themes
which were though likely to be most relevant were identified. Some of the
interviews therefore covered a wide range of the themes listed while others
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focussed virtually exclusively on one or two. In relation to ithe second training
interview and those with representatives of legal services further lists of sub-
themes were drawn up. With the exception of one telephonic interview all
interviews -vere conducted in person. The bulk of interviews exceeded one hour
in duration and a couple exceeded two hours. All of the interviews were recorded
by means of deiai 'ed written notes during the interview. In all cases the interviews
were transcribed onto computer soon thereafter (generally on the same or
following day) with the information organised around the thematic areas or others
which emerged during the interview. Printouts of the interviews were analysed
using a rough coding system to draw out key issues relevant to the study.
The e-mail survey was conducted with the assistance of the Head of the Negative
Discipline Section of the SAPS in Pretoria. A set of questions was drafted by the
author and forwarded to the Negative Discipline office from where it was
circulated to all policing areas with a request that answers be returned within one
week. Replies were eventually received from 15 of the 42 (36%) policing areas in
South Africa. With the exception of one reply received from an Area in the Eastern
Cape all of the replies were received in the form of consolidated reports from the
Provincial Commissioners office. The Gauteng report covered all seven policing
areas, and that from the Free State covered all three policing areas in the province.
The KwaZulu-Natal report covered four of the six policing areas (excluding
Durban and Ulundi). The Free State report also included a report from the
Provincial Commiss.ouers office. In addition to the 15 area reports responses were
also received from the Provincial Commissioners offices in the Western Cape,
Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape. In >lddition to covering 35% of areas, the
replies received also therefore included responses from four of the nine SAPS
Provincial offices. While the responses therefore represent a fair proportion of the
overall , of areas and provinces, they cannot however be seen as
repre. .it. .•vC of .~heoverall state of affairs in the SAPS as sampling IS neither
comprehensive nor n.ou .m.
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Confidentiality
The use of force tends to be seen as a sensitive issue in policing circles and all
interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. The names of interviewees have
therefore not been provided in the Appendix. Chapter 5 is based primarily on
information provided by interviewees, with occasional reference to insights from
the e-mail surveyor from relevant literature. However even where interviewees
are directlv quoted they are not identified.
3. Limitations of research
Due to the fact that the report touches on a wide number of areas (e.g. the history
of policing in South Africa, abuses of human rights in South Africa, general police
management, the use offorce and control thereof, police selection, police training,
police stress and trauma, police suicides police oversight, police and professional
ethics) in relation to each of which much has been written the literature review
does not claim to be comprehensive.
Police culture is known to be fairly secretive and resistant to "outside" intrusion.
Furthermore the use of force is a particularly sensitive area. Scrutiny by outsiders
is feared because it is assumed rbat this will involve application of subjective
judgments which do not accord with those of the police and because police fear
criticism and sanctions as a result of practises relating to the use of force being
publicised.
It was assumed that the research programme, which relies quite extensively on
interviews with police mer..bers, would therefore be likely to come up against a
degree of resistance and suspicion of outside investigation. To a degree this
appears not to have been too significant a problem. This might partly have been
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due to the fact that the research is not actually focussed on exposing covert police
behaviours but rather on un-lerstanding the operation of systems and management
structures in relation to the use of force. Prior to each of the interviews the
researcher explained the purpose of the research project in fairly straightforward
but value neutral terms and this might have tended to put the interviewees at their
ease. Furthermore, as indicated, the researcher was able to benefit from guidance
as to who might be some of the more helpful members of the SAPS to approach
for interviews.
Nevertheless it is likely that some of the interviewees engaged in a degree of
"impression management" (Jupp, 1989, P: 155) which might have involved
presenting police structures as functioning in an optimal manner as well as a
reluctant to acknowledge problematic aspects of the functioning of the SAPS. In
particular one of the Interviewees appeared to regard the interviewer with a degree
of suspicion \Iv hile another one's responses to some of the questions asked appeared
to some extent implausible. Two or the other interviewees, while being relatively
candid, specifically indicated that there were particular aspects which they were
not willing to discuss. In this respect it should also be noted that most of the
interviewees were police managers and therefore to some extent "cut off" from
practises relating to the use of force on the ground.
In analysing the data (both from the interviews and e-mail survey) it will therefore
be necessary to treat responses with a degree of scepticism. A further factor which
might have impacted on the degree of candidness of interviewees was t! ie fact that
the research was approved by senior management of the SAPS. It is possible that
interviewees saw themselves as responding to the authority structure of the SAPS
and appropriately modified their responses. This applies, perhaps even more so,
to the e-mail survey which was sent out from the national office of the Lc:gative
discipline section. At the same time the fact that the research was authorised by
Senior SAPS management and the e-mail survey sent out from within the SAPS
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might have contributed to minimising the distrust of outsiders which is supposed
to characterise policing services and therefore might have also contributed to
placing interviewees to some degree at ease and possibly to some degree of
truthfulness.
Finally the research was conducted over a limited time period and based primarily
on interviews with a small number of members of the police service in the major
urban areas of Gauteng. It must be strongly emphasised that, particularly in
discussing the operation of systems at area and station level, the research is based
on an extremely limited survey of existing practises, and cannot be taken as
representative of how such systems operate throughout the SAPS. Furthermore the
study, based as it is on a range of interviews with relatively senior managers,
should be understood as indicating more how such systems are intended to work
rather than actually evaluating their day to day operation. While it is felt that many
of the conclusions reached in this report are strongly persuasive it should therefore
be borne in mind that this is in many ways an exploratory sketch of the
management of force in the SAPS which was primarily conducted in some of the
more affluent and highly resourced urban areas of South Africa.
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Chapter 5 Systems impacting on the use of
force in the South African Police
Service
Understanding the management of the use of force appears [Q necessitate
understanding the operation of various systems which in one way or another impact
on how force is deployed and used within the South African Police Service. As
indicated the systems or structures which impact on the use of force can be seen
to include ones which are both external and internal to the police service. This
section begins with the discussion of a system, the legal and regulatory framework
which can be characterised as both external and internal. Thereafter this section
focuses on a number of systems internal to the SAPS. 46
1. The common law and the Constitutional, legal and
regulatory framework
Components of the legal and regulatory framework which are relevant to the use
of force include the following:
46 Other external systems or role players, none of which are discussed in this report can be seen to
include: The Independent Complaints Directorate (see footnote 40) which is ill fact regulated by
the SAPS Act provided for in terms of Chapter 10 of the SAPS Act, though functionally
independent (see Melville, 1999); the governmentand parliamentary system including committees
suchas the Standing Committee on Safety and Security; Police unions; the local and international
media: Civilsociety organisations; Communities and community structures including Commuulty
Police Forums, and a range of others.
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The common law
The core provisions of law which justify the use of force are provisions of the common
law which in combination define the circumstances ill which the use afforce in "private
defence" may be justified.
"A person acts in private defence if he defends himself or somebody else against
an unlawful attack upon life, limb, property or dignity .... In daily parlance this
ground of justification is often referred to as "self defence". But this description
is too narrow, since it is not only persons who defend themselves but also those
who defend others who can rely upon this ground or justifica tion" (Snyman, 1995,
p 97).
The law on private defence is of general application and therefore applies to everyone in
South Africa including members of the police service.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996
Chapter 11 of the Constitution deals with security services. In so far as it deals with the
SAPS it largely deals with issues relating to the distribution of national and provincial
powers in relation to political and executive control over the police service. At 205(3) it
provides that "the objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate
crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and
their property, and to uphold and enforce the law. One of the general provisions velating
to security services which may be seen as of direct relevance to the use of force is section
199(6) which provides that "no member of any security service may obey a manifestly
illegal order".
The use of force by the police is not addressed directly anywhere in me Constitution. The
section of the Constitution which has profound arJ wide ranging, though not necessarily
straightforward implications in terms of the use of force is Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights.
Provisions which may be seen as relevant to the use of force include provisions regarding:
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human dignity; life; freedom and security of the person; priva ":y; assembly,
demonstration, picket andpetition; freedom ofmovement and residence; labour relations;
property; children; just administrative action; access to courts; arrested, detained and
accusedpersons, limitationsof rights; statesof emergency.Provisionswhich also impacts
on the investigation of incidents involving the use of force are those which provide, or
support, ilright to remain silent to persons "arrestedfor allegedlycommittingan offence"
(see Savage and Bruce, 1999). It would appear that Section 36(1) of the Bill of
Rights, which provides for rights to be limited by a "law of general application to
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable inan open and democratic
SOciety based on human dignity, equality and freedom" is also relevant to
interpreting provisions of the Constitution and legislation which impact on the use
of force.
The Anus and Ammunition. Act, 75 of 1969 and associated regulations
The Act inter alia defines the circumstances in which a person may be disqualified
from owning a firearm.
II Section 11 "deals with the Commissioner having received information
under oath from a person stating that an applicant or owner of a firearm has
expressed the intention to kill or injure" someone with a firearm. "It also
states that a person could be declared not tit to possess a firearm because
of his/her mental condition, inclination to violence, dependence on an
intoxicating substance or if the person in possession of the firearm failed
to store it safely"(Gun Control Alliance, 1999b).
" Section 12 deals with a person being declared unfit to possess a firearm
inter alia because of a contravention of the Arms and Ammunition Act, or
any other crime listed in the schedules to the Act.
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The requirements for safe storage of firearms are outlined in regulations to the Act
(Gun Control Alliance 1999a). A draft amendment to the Act is presently the
subject of some controversy in the public arena.
The Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977
Provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act which may relate directly the use of
force include sections 27 and section 49.
Section 27(1) empowers a police official who is legally entitled to search any
person or any premises to use "such force as is reasonably necessary to overcome
any resistance against SUC!1 search or against entry of the premises, including the
breaking of any door or window of such premises". Section 27(2) requires that the
police official first audibly clemand admission except in particular circumstances
which are outlined (Joubert, 19:;0, p. 123).
Issues concerning arrest, including when arrest is authorised, are dealt with in the
Criminal Procedure Act primarily in section 39-52. According to Section 39(1)
"Unless the arrestee submits to custody, an arrest is effected by actually touching
his person or, if the circumstances so require, by forcibly confining him" (op cit,
p. 87). The prevailing position in South African, with respect to Section AO the
provision governing the use of force in effecting arrest is one of uncertainty . Early
in 1997 the SAr~ issued a Special Service Order which effectively modified the
fairly permissive provisions of Section 49 particularly by restricting the categories
of offences in relation to which lethal force was authorised. An amendment to
section 49 was passed late in 1998 ("ection 7 of the Judicial Matters Second
Amendment Act, No 122 of 1998). Subsequently however the Minister of Safety
and Security refused to allow the provision to come into operation. (See inter alia
Haysorn, 1987a and 1987b. In relation to the amendment of section 49 see
69
Proudlock, 1999 and Bruce 1999b). Effectively therefore, almost six years after
April 1994, government has not as yet implemented an amendment to this
notorious provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. The current position regarding
the use of lethal force in affecting arrest can therefore only be deduced from an
informed reading of the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act and the SAPS
Special Service Order, and a number of court judgements relating to the issue.
The Regulation of GatheringsAct, No. 205 of 1993
Most notably in sub-section 9(2) the Act provides a framework for the use of force
by the police in situations, inter alia, where a gathering poses a "danger to persons
or property" which cannot be averted by other steps (detailed at 9(1»), or where the
gathering is prohibited.
The South African Police Services Act, 68 of 1995
The powers of members of the police service are to some extent defined by section
13 of the SAPS Act. The issue of the use of force is referred to explicitly in
subsection 13(3) which provides that:
(a) A member who is obliged to perform an official duty, shall, with due
regard to his or her powers, duties and functions, perform such duty in a
manner that is reasonable in the circumstances
(b) Where a member who performs an official duty is authorised by Jaw to use
force. he or she may use only the minimum force which is reasonable in
the circumstances.
Section 13 goes on to provide, inter alia, for searches without warrant (at 13(6»;
the cordoning off of an area (at 13 (7)); and the setting up of roadblocks and search
of persons or vehicles stopped at such roadblocks (at 13(8).
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Policy Oil the prevention of Torture and the Treatment of Persons in Custody of
the South African Police Service
Known as lithe anti-torture policy" at Section 2 it makes it explicit that "no
member may torture any person, permit anyone else to do so, or tolerate the
torture of another by anyone". Torture is prohibited by the South African
Constitution (at 12(1» and, particularly where it involves physical force,
constitutes a criminal offence. It is also, as the policy indicates contrary to the
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984-. The provisions of the policy carne
fully into effect on July I" 1999. The concern of managers within the police
service torture should effectively be a concern to ensure that the use of torture is
totally discouraged and if possible eliminated."
SfiPS Standing Order as amended from time to time
Many of the standing orders of the South African Policy Service are of relevance
in one way or another to the management of the use of force. Most notable is
Standing Order 251 which is discussed below in Section 8. Also of particular
47 As indicated (see footnote 31) in terms of the approach taken in this report the topic of the
management of the use of force, concerned as it with enabling members of the police service to
use force effectively in situations where this is apptopriate, is seen as largely a separate topic
from the subject of the prevention of torture. TIle issue of the prevention oftorture canbe seen
as linked to the more general topic of the "management and care of persons in custody". While
lawful acts of the use of force (e.g, in restraining a person or preventing an escape), and acts of
brutality, do take place in custody and the issue of the management of persons in custody is
therefore related to the issue of the use of force by police (issues include: ensuring that arrested
persons are searched and otherwise prevented from getting access to weapons; the use of
handcuffs and other restraints) tltis report is focnsed on the general issue of the use of force and
does not explicitly address these issues (on issues relating to the management of persons in
custody and the relationship between police lise of force and deaths in custody see, Leigh et al,
1998: Bruce. 1998; and Dissel and Ngubeni, 1999).
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relev...ce is Standing Order 108 in terms of which members are issued with
firearms as part of their personal issue (discussed in the section on systems for
issuing firearms and other weapons to police officers). Other relevant standing
orders would include, for instance, those relating to the operation of the
disciplinary system.
SAPS Discipline Regulations
The regulations outline how disciplinary procedures are to be dealt with. In section
18 the regulations define the different forms of misconduct. In terms of the misuse
offorce 18(3) which indicates that an employee commits misconduct when she or
he "performs an act or fails to perform an act which constitutes an offence" may
be the most relevant.
2. General management of the SAPS
The organisational and management structure of the SAPS
The SAPS is a vast and cumbersome organisation with a staff complement of
roughly 129000 which included, in 1998, 12300 commissioned officers, 97760
noncommissioned officers (including students) and 19 000 civilians. Roughly 60
000 members are involved in "visible policing" while 21 000 are based in detective-
units (Nel and Conradie, 1998, P.5). The Public Order Policing ~.xtion has
roughly 7 600 members
.'
The SAPS is structured at national, provincial, area and station levels. The
structure with the greatest degree of authority in the SAPS is probably the National
Management committee which includes the National Commissioner, the 10
divisional commissioners and 9 provincial commissioners and meets roughly every
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two months. Under the National and Deputy National Commissioners of the SAPS
are organised a number of divisions each under the authority of a Divisional
Commissioner.
In terms of a restructuring plan announced in December 1998 the divisional
management of the SAPS was restructured from five into ten divisions. These
divisions are: Management Services, Personnel Services, Training, Crime
Prevention, Operational Response Services, the Detective Service, Crime
Intelligence. Career Management, Logistics, and Financial and Admin Services.
(The organogram in Appendix 5 provides an outline of this divisional structure).
Of these divisions the following seven would appear to be most relevant to the use,
and management, of force within the SAPS:
• Management Services - inter alia the legal services section" of this division
plays a major role in ensuring that the legal and regulatory framework
(l::scussed in section 1 above) is communicated to members of the police
service and, where necessary, incorporated into internal regulations and
standing orders;
• Personnel Services - the psychological and social work services sections
of the SAPS fall under this division which deals, inter alia, with
recruitment (discussed in section 4), the provision of support services to
police members (discussed in section 11) as well as promotions, transfers,
leave and organisational health and safety;
• Training - (the role of tne training in the management of the use of terce
is discussed in section 5);
48 Many of the divisions have a legal services section. For instance that in the personnel division is
focused more on labour law issues. There are also legal staff at each of the provincial and area
offices.
73
• The four divisions concerned most directly with operational policing."
The divisions per se do not receive much attention in the remainder of this
report. Their interaction with the use of force is understood primarily to be
through the other systems outlined in this report and through that of
ordinary members, who, whether as members involved in visible policing,
detective or public order units, effectively fall under these divisions.
The 10 divisions are also represented at the provincial level, and have offices at the
area level, though on a smaller scale which should enable them to function in a
more integrated manner.
The provincial and national levels are to a great extent a management coordinating
structure. 50 To some extent the management of the organisation can be understood
in terms of "top down" and "bottom up" issues. Top down issues would include
for example regulatory issues, for instance relating to the implementation of new
law", policies and regulations. In relation to plans to combat crime for instance,
some priorities are set at the national level (potentially by the Minister). The
provincial structure wilt then co-ordinate development and implementation of
strategies. However implementation primarily actually takes place at the area and
station level. Bottom up issues may for instance concern problems being
experienced in particular areas.
49 Crime Prevention- responsible, interalia, foruniformed (visible) policing; Operational Response
Services - responsible, inter alia, for Public Order Policing and Border Policing; the Detective
Service - sections of the service deal, inter alia, with, general investigations, serious and violent
crime, organised crime, and responsible for the Criminal Record Centre and Forensic Science
Laboratory; Crime Intelligence
50 These' levels nevertheless do have operational units attached to them. For instance the VIP
protectionunit is linked to the Clime Intelligence division, while Public Order Policing units are
linked to the provincial level.
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The area level on the other hand engages directly with issues which relate to the
management of stations. Overall in South Africa there are 42 policing areas within
which roughly 1200 police stations are situated.
The members of the SAPS therefore are primarily based at these stations or in
specialised units which are based at area level. Inthe Johannesburg Area there are
roughly 23 police stations while in Soweto Area there are roughly 12. Examples
of specialised units in the Soweto Area include the Child Protection Unit, the
Firearm Investigation Unit, the Internal Investigation Unit (1IU), the Murder and
Robbery Unit, and branches of the Flying Squad and the South African Narcotics
and Alcohol Bureau (SANAB). Station commissioners and the heads of specialised
units fall under the overall command of the area commissioner.
Ope' I oersonnel are then primarily uniformed members who are based at the
str ~l, detectives, who are based either at police stations or in one of the
.sed units and Public Order Police members based in linked to the
mcial level. It is primarily these I•.embers, roughly 90 000 in all, who
fiu .entially may be involved in the use of force.
Structures of command and control at station and unit level
Personnel at station level might be allocated to a one of a number of sections, units
or divisions (not to be confused with the national divisions discussed above). For
instance at some stations staff are either allocated to the charge office (often
referred to as the Community Service Centre), the investigative services division,
crime prevention unit, crime intelligence unit, and for instance a plain clothes
"crime combatting" units. Charge office staff other than those responsible for
staffing the Community Service Centre might be involved in patrol along with
members of the crime prevention unit.
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In addition to the heads of various sections one of the important line management
functions is that of the "shift commander'v" who is the senior member on the shift
and might be a member' of Captain, Inspector or Sergeant rank. The shift
commander is in overall charge of the charge office and people on patrol. He or
she might, for instance, be based in the charge office and occasionally go out on
patrol to check on what the other members are doing. Alternatively the shift
commander might base him or herself with people on patrol. The shift commander
might therefore be the same person as, or in charge of, the charge office
commander or the person is charge of members on patrol. 52 Depending on the size
of the station the shift commander might, on any shift therefore be in charge of
anything from a handful to about 30 members.
In addition for being responsible for ensuring that complaints in the charge office
are attended to the charge office commander should visit the cells on an hourly
basis. At smaller stations she or he will be in charge ..,fcells though some bigger
stations have a person specifically designated to this task.
The officer on duty (duty office")
Another significant role, though one which may be understood fairly differently
in different areas is that of the "duty officer". 53 As far as could be ascertained the
duty officer appears to have a general responsibility for attending "scenes" of a
serious nature. These might include serious crime scenes (the scene is nevertheless
under the control of the investigating officer), scenes where police are shot or
otherwise injured and the scenes of police shootings where the duty officer is
5i Referred to in Standing Orders as the "relief commander" (see SO 256).
52 In standing orders the "section commander" hut often referred to as "wykbevelvoerder" which
is Afrikaans for area commander (See SO ;', .3).
53 As far as could be a<·,:,'ained the position or role of duty officer is not defined in Standing
Orders. SO 251 merely .efers to "an officer".
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responsible for investigating the incident and compiling the shooting incident
report. 54
It appears that the duty officer function is organised differently in different policing
areas. Thus at some stations the duty officer position is allocated to 2 to 4-
members, of officer rank, at the station, who then fulfil the responsibilities either
in relation to specific units or on a rotating basis. The station commander might
fill in for one or more of the duty officers if, for instance, they were sick or on
leave. These station based duty officers are responsible for investigating shooting
incidents involving specialised units (such as the Flying Squad) which take place
in their station area.
In another area where the study was conducted the interviewee indicated that the
duty officer position served as a "stand-in" for the station commander at night time
when the latter is not on duty. Here the duty officer is the officer in charge at the
Area (often the Flying Squad) radio control. In addition to the circumstances
outlined'· t]1p duty officer would also be called in where "there is a complaint
against .ice officer that can't be resolved by the shift commander". The station
cornman. would fulfil the responsibilities associated with the duty officer during
the day."
Thegeneral management of the SAPS and responsibilityfor the management of
the use of force
S4 At 251.15.1 it specifies that "if an officer was not present at the time of the incident, [the
commander or other senior member referred to in 251.15.1 J shall immediately arrange to notify
an officer about the incident. ill order that, that officer can visit the scene withe ,t delay to
investigate thoroughly the circumstances of the shooting incident.
55 The investigation of shooting incidents whether carried out by a "duty officer" or other person
(in what follows tho::shooting incident investigator will be referred to as the duty officer) is
explored further in section 8 of this chapter.
77
The SAPS as an organisation can be understood as a system for the deployment of
force. Thus any decisions made regarding the allocation of SAPS members to a
particular geographical area or task is effectively a decision relating to the
deployment of the capacity to use force (though members are deployed in relation
to their other capabilities as well). But this does not mean that managers in the
SAPS, pre-occupied as they are with a potentially extensive range of tasks, devote
much attention to the management of the use of force. Thus; some station
commanders, other than by minimal attention to issues relating to the issuing of
firearms to police officers (see section 6) and occasionally to disciplinary issues
(see section 9) might otherwise be said to be hardly involved in the management
of the use of force if this is understood as direct attention to actual issues
associated with the use of force in the police service.
One of the questions which this research tried to address is whether there is in
some sense a "key level" of the SAPS in terms of the management of the use of
force. The answer to this question would appear to be roughly the following:
II Some station commanders or heads of specialised units might give a
relatively greater level of attention to issues concerning the use of force,
for instance by occasionally addressing issues relating to the laws and
values which should inform police officers in relation to their use of force,
by maintaining a greater degree of scrutiny over the conduct of police
officers and by implementing remedial or corrective measures where
appropriate, or by attending to issues relating to the provision of training
to members.
o More generally however the key component of the SAPS concerned with
the management of the use of force would appear to be the legal sections,
based particularly at area but also at provincial level, operating to a greater
or lesser degree in cooperation with the (negative) discipline section at area
level.
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As the report will argue, the latter aspect reflects the basic approach, and
limitations of the management of the use of force within the SAPS, which is
primarily orientated towards an emphasis on legal issues and standards.
Information systems for monitoring the use of force
The SAPS maintains a computerised database (the PERSAP database) which is
intended, inter alia to serve as facility for recording all shooting incidents. An
analysis of shootings recorded on the database over the 1996 - 1998 period
indicated that shooting incident data had only been recorded with a reasonable level
of consistency in three" of South Africa's nine provinces during the period in
question (see Bruce and O'Malley, 1999). It appears that an instruction was issued
in 1997 to the effect that data, which previously had been entered from the national
office, should henceforward he issued by staff based at the area offices. While in
some provinces a deterioration in the level of recording of shooting incidents
appears to have roughly coincided with this instruction it nevertheless appears that
levels of recording in many provinces prior to the instruction was far from
satisfactory. In the Northern Province four shootings were recorded on the
database during the three years in question.
However even in those areas or provinces where data is entered on the data base
it is far from clear that the information recorded is used for any purpose, connected
to the monitoring of the use of force (The issue is discussed further in section 8).
The SAPS also appears to have problems in gathering reliable information
regarding complaints and civil and disciplinary cases against members (see Bruce
and O'Malley, 1999, p. 47)
The provinces ore the Western Cape. Eastern Cape and Free State.
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3. Values of the SAPS related to the use of force
All organisations in some ways r and reflect, though sometimes by default,
certain values which are reflected 1... _ culture a.id practises of the organisaticn.
"An organisations values create its culture which is a powerful influence On
people's behaviour, 111 tn:'lnyways, culture defmes the way people do things in the
organisation ... this points to the [police] department's need to carefully develop
~ statement of values, as opposed to letting culture develop without serious
consideration" (IvIajor City Chief Administrators, 1991, p. 23).
The Code of Conduct ~" ," . South African Police Service
The importance of values to the police, has been recognised by the SAPS who in
1997 developed and adopted a Code of Conduct. However despite the fact that the
use of force is a core and distinguishing characteristic of the police role the SAPS
code of conduct makes no direct reference to it. The code, intended to be signed
by all SA'S members commits them inter alia to:
.. "at all times .. uphold the constitution and the law"; and
It "undertake to uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person".
As noted above (see section 1) the South African Constitution, which the Code
refers to. makes no direct reference to the issue of the use of force by the police.
Effectively therefore the Code requires of members that in order to understand the
formal organisational values of the SAPS in relation to the use of force members
need to make an in depth study of the Constitution. Furthermore the Code appears
to fail to recognise that the police in fact are the one key agency in society that is
most frequently required, in certain circumstances, to impose on people's rights,
sometimes through the use of force. In the words of Coady and Bloch "some
[codes of conduct] contain statements of such generality that they could not be
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disagreed with, but they also provide very little practical guidance"(1996, p. 9).
In providing guidance to SAPS members in relation to the use of force. and
arguably in relation to the police role generally, it would appear that the SAPS
Code of Conduct is in many ways fairly inadequate.
The role played by middle management in promoting values relating to the use
of force
Effectively therefore the SAPS provides no national statement of values to its
members that directly addresses issues of values relating to the use of force. An
indication of how values relating to the use of force are understood, and sometimes
articulated, by the middle management level of the SAPS can he gained through
examining the responses received to one of the questions in the e-mail survey sent
to the offices of SAPS Area Commissiouers. The question asked respondents to
indicate what, if any, "message" the Area office tries to send out members in
relation to the use of force". 57 One of the strong characteristics of a Dumber of the
responses received was an emphasis on legal rules. For example one response
indicated that "members were made aware of the proposed amendments to Section
49" while another stated that "to the extent that a 'message' is sent out, the
message is that the use of force must comply with applicable legal rules". Other
responses were more threatening in tone, stating, tor example, that "no member
of the service is above the law of the country and when the law is contravened they
will be dealt with severely according to the law." Related to this was an emphasis
on the potential conseq: nces of the misuse of force for members. In addition to
emphasising that membe is who acted illegally would be prosecuted, others
57 It should benotcd that the question wnsmerely "whatmessage?" is sent out The issue of to what
extent the message is properly communicated, or emphasised, and whether it is contradicted by
other "messages" sent out by the same office, or by other sections of the SAPS, is not addressed
here.
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indicated that unlawful use of firearms could lead to suspension or dismissal from
the service.
Aprt from this the fifteen replies received were somewhat diverse but included
references to:
• Discouraging the use offorce - for example" members should refrain from
the use of force ... ", "force should only be used as a last resort";
II Discouraging excessive force - for example "members should refrain from
using excessive force ... "
.. The conditions members should observe when using force - for example
referring to "minimum justifiable force" or "appropriate force" or to using
force "responsibly" or "fairly".
'" Conditions for using firearms - for example members should "only use
their firearms when their own, or other people's lives are in danger",
"members are encouraged to act responsibly when using firearms".
'" One referred to the Code of Conduct and one (from a Provincial office) to
the Constitution as guiding documents. Another said that "regular
discussions are held with members regarding the subject [of the use of
force] and human rights generally".
There was therefore little in the way of consistency in the response received.
Furthermore the responses were uneven in their quality. Some, sometimes fairly
succinctly I addressed key issues relating to the use of force while others were
completely insubstantial effectively ignoring major issues relating to the USi! of
force and indicating a lack of understanding of the issues at hand. 58 Finally of the
many responses which emphasised legal standards, some did so in a manner which
5& For instance one Area's sale respc. _.to the question was that "the amended Act regarding the
use of Iirearms must be adhereu • The response would appear to demonstrate an ignorance
both as to the fact 111athe Act in q, don is not in force and .:lV.l there are major issues relating
to the use afforce that do not COl'~CUl firearms.
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was primarily threatening in nature. In only describing those levels of behaviour
"below which a member should not be entitled to act" such statements fail to
"embrace the ethical ideals" (Coady and Bloch, op cit, p. 6) of the police
occupation. Furthermore such messages may ring hollow, particularly if, as may
often be the case, they are only selectively implemented.
The POP Policy Document On Crowd Management
One section of the SAPS where the need for a statement of values has been
recognised is the Public Order Police. The POP PoU y Document on Crowd
Management sets out the "goals" of the POP as well as a set of "principles of
crowd management" (South African Police Service, undated). Amongst the goals
set out by POP are:
• being firm, fair and impartial, ...
" no loss of life, ..
• no injuries, ..
.. all citizens present at a gathering to feel safe and secure.
The POP policy therefore provides a set of ideals or goals. In some situations
which POP members deals with these may be difficult to achieve. But they may be
seen to serve to guide POP members in understanding the values which should
inform their actions.
Discussion
In relation to the use of deadly force Geller and Scott, state that
"Ultimately, to minimise or, more accurately, to "optimise" the use of
deadly force by police (tha; is, to attain a proper combination of prudent
restraint and prudent use of force), the values of the police culture need to
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be purposefully shaped. The object of such efforts at managing organisation
culture is to encourage a high respect for human life among officers and
encourage responsible - but not foolhardy - restraint in the use of force".
(1991, p. 470).
One of the many themes of international literature on policing concerns the
informal culture of rank and tile member of the police organisation, how this is
shaped by occupational pressures and influences, and tends to be characterised by
something of a divide between the worlds of "street" and "management" cops
(Punch, 1983; See also forinstance Reiner, 1992). Shaping the values of members
of a police service is therefore not a simple or straightforward task. Not only does
addressing the Issue of organisational values require a statement of such
organisational values
or policy but it requires that managers in the organisation, and others, such as
training staff continually address these issues. In order for this to be done
effectively however it has to be done in a way which addresses the realities of
police occupational life.
Other than in the POP Policy it seems clear that issues of values relating to the use
of force by SAPS members are not concretely addressed in any policy statement.
As long as the SAPS lacks a clear policy of this kind, SAPS managers will
effectively be denied a proper tool for engaging with members about these issues.
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4 The recruitmentand selection system
The selection of new recruits 59
Since about 1992 the psychological services section has been involved increasingly
in addressing issues of selection in the recruitment process. In 1997 the SAPS
received roughly 500 000 applications for 1 200 posts which had been advertised
as part of a drive for new recruits. After "hard criteria" such as whether the
applicant has a drivers licence and standard 10 or matric'" a large number of
applicants remained. Psychological services was involved in compiling a battery
of tests, based on an extensive analysis of the characteristics of police work. The
battery, involving 11 tests in all, was applied ic 19 000 applicants. The results
enabled a final short list of 2 000 applicants to be drawn up. These were
interviewed by selection panels using a standardised interview in order for the final
1 200 selected.
The tests were intended to assist in identifying a range of character traits associa
with effectiveness in the police role. Some of the qualities tested for wouk,
however appear to be relevant in some way to the use of force and perhaps to
whether recruits are susceptible to misusing force in both occupational and non
occupational domains. These factors may include:
.. Mental alertness - addresses issue of how person is going to function under
pressure;
59 The basic training system - see section 5 below - effectively also functions as part of the selection
system for new recruits. Those who fail specific tests or examinations (passing requirements are
set at different levels for different tests) are not inducted into the police service (See section 37
of tile SAPS Act 68 of 1995).
60 The SA citizenship criteria which was applied in 1997 has since been dispensed with.
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<I Cognitive skills - includes testing of verbal. skills through tests of
vocabulary. An assessment of verbal skills was also made during
interviews;
" Interpersonal skills: includes assertiveness and "influencing style";
• Stress and frustration tolerance;
• External or intemallocus of control - the tendency to accept responsibility
as opposed to blaming others for ones situation. 61
Discussion
According to Grant and Grant "selection procedures need to take into account not
only the. diversity of current police performance requirements, but also the
changing demands on the police and the consequent changing nature of policing"
(1996, p. 153. See also Coetzee and Shaw, 1998). However psychological. tests
may not accurately assess the individuals psychological traits. Furthermore police
officers may "change over time and may develop problems related (Q their
performance long after their probationary period" (p. 155). Factors in the police
organisation, the community, and in his or her domestic world will continue to
int1uence and impact on the police officer as well, possibly contributing to changes
in behaviour.
Psychological testing is not a fail safe mechanism for ensuring that recruits are not
prone to violence. It is nevertheless likely that it makes some contribution to
improving the quality of recruit selection and may have some benefit in
contributing to th ~selection of police recruits who are less prone to the abuse of
61 In addition to ass 'sting in :l!e process of selecting new recruits the Psychological Services section
has also been invc 1"~..iin developing selection systems for some of the specialised units such as,
for example, the special taskforce, bomb units or the dog unit. Potentially the assistance may be
provided to anyunitforwhichspecialised training is needed and not just the "high tension" units.
A special selection process has alsr been used for the Public Order Police though as far as is
known this has not been connected with the work of Psychological Services.
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force. However, in so far a'. it does have beneficial consequences this is only likely
to impact 011 the SAPS relatively slowly partly due to the fact that as the SAPS is
not acquiring new recruits at a particularly rapid rate. Finally neither selection, nor
as th, eport argues, training, can substitute for day to d2Yattention by managers
to issues relating to the use of force by operational personnel.
5. Training
Basic training
The old basic training framework (see Rauch 1992b) was extensively revised
during the mid 1990s with the assistance of a range of international policing and
police training experts (see Scharf and Van Der Spuy, 1995). At the same time,
while foreign expertise was drawn on, those involved in red ..signing the
curriculum attempted to ensure that the basic training curriculum appropriately
reflected South African realities.
The current basic training programme is structured into an initial 26 weeks of
training at the SAPS college in Pretoria, four weeks of training in tactical policing
at Malleoskop and a further 22 weeks of field training, under the guidance I1f a
Field Training Officer, at one of the pol'c; stations sround the country where such
officers are based. The curriculum is presented in terms of an "integrai -d
approach" where each "topic" is dealt with in terms of ethical, legal and functional
aspects. TI1lSapproach helps to avoid problems previously experienced where, in
the words of one interviewee "what one person [for example the law person] was
saying was often contradicted by another". The emphasis within the new
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curriculum is also on providing "basic guidelines". "We cannot provide everything
they need to know" an interviewee said.
The following components of the current basic training programme may be seen
as directly relevant to the use of force by members of the police service
g Physical training;
II Training regarding physical and mental disablers."
II Communication skill-
• Conflict resolution;
• Authority presence,"
II Weaponless defence;
• Tonia training:
II Firearm training;
II Tactical policing;
" Familiarisation with protective equipment (bullet-proof vests),
The basic training programme appears to deal with the issue of the use of force
fairly comprehensively and with a high level of sophistication. It would appear that
the programme addresses issues of skill in the use offorce, along with legal issues.
Without having ext .sively analysed the framework of values presented in the
basic training currier Ium it is not possible to comment on it in detail, Some
apparent shortcomings would appear to be that:
• It may reproduce some of the overall flaws of the SAPS policy and values
framework relating to the use of force (as discussed in Section 3)
6Z Deals with how to minimise one's susceptibility to factors. such as alcoholism or heart disease,
which can physically and mentally debilitate.
h3 Deals with aspects of posture, dress, facial expression. body language, "overall confident
appearance" etc. required to assert authority and uiereby obtain compliance.
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particularly in relation to issues of (skill in) avoiding unnecessary force 64
as well as in relation to the defence of life principle.
.. As Fyfe emphasises police training must address the role of p J!;ce during
their non-working hours.
"Answers to the question of what is appropriate police action, however,
vary dramatically depending on whether an officer is on duty. It is
relatively easy to prescribe appropriate police actions for officers who are
in uniform, in easily identifiable police vehicles, in radio contact with their
colleagues, and not a party that gave rise to the need for police
intervention. But these prescriptions may be singularly inappropriate for an
officer who enjoys none of these conditions and who may find that his or
her actions may simply make bad situations worse" (1996, p. 177).
The curriculum does not appear to deal with the issue of the responsibilities of
police officers while off duty. However here again, the training system would
merely appear to be reflecting shortcomings of overall SAPS policy.
Notwithstanding these possible limitations it appears that the SAPS Basic Training
programme may in many ways be exemplary in its engagement with issues relating
to the use of force 65 Regrettably however it appears that its benefits are unlikely
to be sustained once recruits complete their initial year of training.
64 The issue is touched on in the lecture on authority presence (Module 1, Study Unit 5).
65 The Public Order Police also appear to have, and be involved in the further development of, a
relatively sophisticated training system which deals directly with issues of minimising the need
for violence, as well as limiting the risks which police members are exposed to. However for
reasons of brevity this is not examined here. A particularly promising aspect however is the
development, by personnel in the Public Order Development Services of a training programme
on "Preventative Survival Tactics" described by an interviewee as "strategies for avoiding the
need to use force and becoming a victim of violence". here.
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In-service training 66
Interviewees at police stations indicated that the system of in-service training
relating to the use of force suffers from serious deficiencies. A recently appointed
commander at one station indicated that on his arrival he had discovered that there
had been no firearm traiu'ng for members in the last six years. At another station
in another policing area a senior member indicated that he couldn't remember any
firearm training at the station since 1993,61
Whether in-service training is provided or not would appear in part to depend on
whether the station commander has given attention to the issue. Furthermore
stations where Field Training Officer have been appointed are able to channel this
training capacity into one which is of benefit to members at the station generally.
A handful of members from each station, it appears, are occasionally able to attend
SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) courses at special SAPS weapons training
facilities. Finally in some areas members occasionally received lectures
particularly regarding new aspects of law relating to the use of firearms.
As might be expected the basic obstacles to providing in service training are those
of the availability of the financial and human resources for this purpose.
Furthermore, where for instance there are openings in a SWAT training course the
implication may be that the station or unit at which they are based will suffer
shortages in terms of the availability of personnel. 68
66 Another aspect of training relevant to the use offeree is that in debriefing skills, which is referred
to in the discussion of critical incident debriefing in section 10. The issue of to what extent
management training addresses issues of the use of force IS not ~ridressed in this report.
67 111so far as there is a policy on the issue this would appear to be that members should receive
firearm training roughly twice every year.
68 One of the interviewees, the commander of a rapid reaction unit which has its own "in house"
training personnel, indicated that as a result of personnel shortages it was not possibly to
withdraw members from their duties. Members who attend in service training do so 011 one of
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In their responses to questions regarding in-service training respondents effective! y
highlighted what would appear to be another major flaw of the system. In service
training, at least in relation to the physical aspects of the use of force (at some
stations there is also occasional training all the legal aspects). is apparently
understood as being almost synonymous with firearm training. Effectively in-
service training, where it exists at all, appears to serve as a mechanism for re-
producing the SAPS's firearm reliance in relation to the use of force (similarly the
lectures on issues of law tend to focus on lethal force).
As Fyfe remarks "most often it does not matter whether officers' actions conform
with their tactical training". As a result "some of the most critical police violence
reduction and prevention skills are needed so rarely that they are likely to atrophy
into uselessness unless officers receive frequent refresher training" Periodic
training therefore, reminds them "that there are real dangers out there. "(1996, p.
176 - 177). The issue of in service training presents real difficulties partly in terms
of making appropriate resources available. Nevertheless consistent in-service
training would appear to be a necessity in maintaining and developing the capacity
of members to adequately perform their responsibilities in terms of the use of
force.
Maintaining physical fitness
A further cause for concern is the level of attention to the maintenance of basic
standards of physical fitness by SAPS members. Members of the police service
who fsil to maintain their own physical fitness are likely to be more susceptible to
finding themselves either unable to cope with situations requiring the use of force,
their rest days every month.
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or where they are, unable to do so other than by relying on their firearms. Basic
physical fitness is not something that can be addressed through the in- service
training and should be recognised as primarily a, often neglected, responsibility of
individual members. Such neglect is potentially also a problem that needs to be
addressed by management.
6. Weapons and other equipment - systems for issuing,
inspection and confiscation 69
Issuing of firearms and ammunition
(a) Service pistols -108 and station issue
Standing Order 48 specifies that service pistols are to be issued to members with
other equipment which is detailed on the SAP 108, the list of equipment issued to
members when they leave police college. Most members have pistols which have
been issued to them on their 108 issue.
Where members do not have 108 issue firearms, firearms are usually issued to
them as "station issue" by the logistics section at the station. Effectively the
difference between 108 and station issue firearms is that latter weapon has to be
handed in by the member if she or he is transferred to another station.
69 This section overlapstco some extentwithissues raised in subsequent sections. This section deals
with the confiscation of firearms from police officers in situations of alleged misconduct
particularly where this involves the misuse of firearms. This section touches on the issue of the
role of the helping professions in assisting officers withalcohol or stress related problems. Issues
relating to the role of the "helping professions" in providing support to officers - particularly
followiug incidents of tile usc of force are discussed in section 9. The general issue of
disciplinary procedures relating to members involved in alleged misuses of force is discussed.
frrther in section In.
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While the general practise has been to issue firearms on the 108 issue it appears
that, in about the mid-1990s there was a temporary shift away from this practise,
and an instruction was given out that firearms should be administered as part of the
station issue system In addition it appears that, prior to 1994, SAP practise was
not to issue black members, unless they attained officer rank, with 108 or
permanent station issue weapons. Exceptions were sometimes however made
where black members applied to be issued with weapons on a permanent basis on
the grounds of threats to their personal safety.
All members who have 108 or station issue firearms are supposed to have a fixed
safe at horne for storage of the firearm. The implication of enforcing this
requirement is that the station or unit management inspect the persons home in
order to confirm that she or he has a safe. Otherwise, as one interviewee said" a
guy could lie and say I've got a safe". Furthermore the current Arms and
Ammunition Act appears to provide a loophole in this regard in that it merely
specifies that the person must have "access to a safe".
(b) Firearms issued for specific shifts or tasks
A member who dues not have a station or 108 issue firearm will therefore be
issued with a firearm when he or she comes on duty and would hand in the firearm
at the end of the shift. These weapons are therefore stored in weapon storage
facilities at the station or unit. Where members are issued with other weapons or
pistols, such as the R5 assault rifle, these should be booked out from the storage
facility for a specific shift. Where police reservists are issued with service pistols,
this should also be in terms of this system.
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(c) Ammunition
At one of the station where interviews were conducted practise is to issue members
with 30 rounds (2 magazines) of ammunition while at another station the practise
is to issue them with 25 rounds (a box). Administration relating to ammunition is
also dealt with by the logistics department.
Other weapons - the tonfa
The tonfa is a special type of baton and appears to be the main LTL or
intermediate weapon in use by the SAPS. However, apparently due to problems
with misuse of the tonfa, the current state of affairs is that, in 'errns of an
instruction issued by National Head Office, members who have n,n received tonfa
training are forbidden to carry the weapon. With only ~ ...nority of SAPS
members having received tonfa training, it would therefore appear that the majority
of operational SAPS members are effectively denied an intermediate weapon.
Furthermore, according to one of the interviewees a problem with the tonfa is that
"if you don't keep in touch with tonfa you will forget it". It would appear that in
terms of the current operation of the system of in-service training, members may
be unlikely to maintain their tonfa skills.
Other equipment
Other equipment which may be issued to police members and which is specifically
relevant to issues of the use of force, restraint of arrested persons, and officer
safety is the following:
• Handcuffs - usually issued to members up to the rank of Captain.
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10 Two way radios - in some station areas all police have radios, in others
not.
• Bullet proof vests - in SOme"high risk" units the use of bullet proof vests
is mandatory but at other stations it is optional. While press reports have
indicated that there may be problems 0 f bullet proof vests not being used
by SAPS members (The Star, 25 May 1999) according to an interviewee
some stations have a shortage of such vests. The interviewee said that "in
terms of equipment the biggest shortage is bullet-proof vests".
• Vehicles70 ••. the issue of the use of vehicles (and pursuit generally) in
relation to the use of force is not discussed in tbis paper. One interviewee
remarked however that "If you have a faster car you can control the
situation. If their vehicle is more powerful, shooting might be the only
chance to apprehend them. "
• Other equipment - other equipment, such as torches, sometimes used in
use of force situations, is somedmes provided.
Inspections
Standing orders provide for both a daily inspection" particularly for uniform
members (in the detective section for instance this may take more of the form of
a "briefing") prior to each shift as well as a six monthly inspection and annual
parade inspection". The daily inspection is intended as a means of checking that
70 As mentioned - see footnote 33 - in certain situations motor vehicles may be used as a type of
weapon. However whether or not they are classified as such they definitely qualify as equipment
which impacts on the police capacity to use force (For more on the usc of vehicles in policing,
particularly in vehicle pursuits, see for instance, Alpert (1987), Alpert & Durnham (1989),
Durnham, Alpert et al (1998), and Kappeler and Del Carmen £1990))
71 Standing Order 256.1.5.112/3 is relevant here.
n Standing Order 28. (20) is relevant here.
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firearms are in working order, as well as for instance the tidiness of members. At
the time of the parade inspection all equipment is supposed to be checked.
The interviewee at one station indicated that they had recently introduced a firearm
inspection register. This is one of the registers tilled in at inspections held once
fortnightly. Firearms are inspected for cleanliness and members must account for
missing rounds.
Circumstances which may lead to confiscation of 'firearms from members
(a) Members with alcohol, stress or other personal or domestic problems or
demonstrating suicide risk behaviour
In certain circumstances where it appears that a member is experiencing personal
problems of one kind or another this may lead to his or her firearm being
withdrawn. One of the interviewees, the head of a reaction unit, indicated that in
his unit whenever there are indications that a member is experiencing any stress
related problems, including for instance the abuse of alcohol, depression or excess
levels of aggression, his firearm will be taken away immediately. The situation will
be reported to the Area social worker who will make contact with the member and
possibly refer him for counselling or to a clinic for people with alcohol problems.
Thereafter the member will work for a month on "inside" duties such as in the
control room. During this time the member in question will be monitored by the
social worker, a doctor and the head of the unit. At month end a meeting, which
is attended by the members shift commander [supervisor], decides whether the
member is fit to resume his normal duties. Potentially the shift commander may
be in the best position to give feedback as to whether person is still manifesting
problem behaviour. The doctor also needs to specify that he is fit to resume duties.
Only if the member is judged properly fit to resume normal duties will this be
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permitted. During the entire period in question the member's firearm is taken
away.
Where problems are reported the interviewee said this might be by the member
him or herself, by family members or by colleagues. Sometimes, where a person
reports another person, they will request that his or her identify be kept
confidential, though this is not necessarily the case.
Another station commander also indicated that where amerrber whose firearm had
been confiscated applies to have the firearm returned (for example in connection
with personal safety) an investigation will be initiated into the matter. This may
include interviews with family members and possibly, for instance where there has
been evidence of depression, obtaining a certificate from a medical practitioner.
Where there is access to a social worker, he or she might also be asked to evaluate
whether the member is a threat to himself or herself or someone else.
As discussed in Chapter 2, negative consequences for the SAPS, associated with
the use of force, include not only a high rate of murders of police officers (in
relation to which the robbery of the service pistol is believed frequently to be a
motive) but also an exceptionally high rate of police suicides of which in the
region of 95% are committed using the service weapon.
The SAPS has begun to attempt to address the suicide problem, with about about
3.5 million in RDP funds having been allocated to the development of a suicide
prevention programme. The money has first of all been used for research imended
to identify, inter alia to what extent, commanders or other persons were aware of
"warning signs" prior to the suicides of particular members. Initial indications are
that fairly frequently members who committed suicide were experiencing financial
or alcohol related problems or problems in their marriages or other intimate
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relationships. It appears that a significant number of suicides are those of members
who have been suspended, particularly those suspended without pay. Subsequently
work has been conducted on the development of a curriculum for suicide
prevention, intended to assist managers in identifying risk factors and procedures
to follow where such factors are apparent.
To some extent SAPS practise is already to withdraw the service weapon, and any
personal firearms where a member demonstrates behaviour which points to a risk
of suicide. However it is not clear to what extent such practise is consistently
followed. Another issue here relates to the ability of managers to identify the fact
that the member is experiencing problems. If a member is booking off work
regularly, has frequently been absent from work, or has reported for duty while
drunk, these might be positive indications that the member is experiencing
problems of one kind or another.
A key difficulty is evaluating the seriousness of the behaviour in question. Thus
one station commander indicated that where there are indications that a member
has an alcohol problem, it is not necessarily regarded as mandatory to send the
member for treatment. Initial an effort might be made to discuss the issue with the
member and to adopt "remedial steps". Another interviewee mentioned the case of
a colleague and friend of his who had committed suicide. Both the service and
personal firearms of the member, who was experiencing family problems, had in
fact been taken from him. However the member managed to persuade the
psychiatrist that he was okay and his firearms were returned to him. Whether he
did this with the express purpose of committing suicide or tor other reasons is not
clear" .
According to an SAPS psychologist "police men see taking their service pistol away
as removing their status" (quoted in Krost, 1S>98).It appears that poll members
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who have had their firearms withdrawn might often modify their behaviour with
the primary purpose of persuading the relevant persons that they are in a suitable
state of mind to be in possession of a firearm. The reality may be that their
underlying problems continue. As one of the station commanders said "we will
take their guns away until we are satisfied that they've recovered - but it's eliNay"
a difficult thing to know". In addition, he added "guns are something we are not
short of'. Even where both personal and private firearms are withdrawn, members
may have access to other firearms, for instance, through oorrowing these from
colleagues.
(b) Alleged criminal acts involving firearms or the use or threat of violence
The station or unit commander then has a general discretion to "onfilScate a
members tirearm(s). Sometimes this occurs where the member has been involved
in an alleged unlawful shooting. In such a case the firearm rnivht need to be
handed in partly because it needs to have ballistic tests. However firearms may
also be confiscated where an offence which does not involve the shooting of a
firearms, has allegedly been committed by a member. Tnis should be done
particularly where the alleged offence is the unlawful pointing of a firearm or any
alleged offence involving the use or threat of violence. Sortetime, for instance
station commanders might receive information from a member's wife to the effect
that he has threatened to shoot her, or information from another person that he was
involved in the reckless use c.the firearm. If the alleged offence or incident occurs
in an area outside the members station or unit area, the s.ation commander in that
areas should report it to the members commander so taat appropriate steps can be
taken.
According to one interviewee sometimes, depending on the seriousness of the
offence, a member might simply be called into the office and reprimanded, or
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submitteu to an informal punishment, and no official disciplinary action will be
taken. This however might change if the offence happens a second time. Some
commanders will rather handle things informally as formal steps potentially
jeopardise a member's career.
Depending on the circumstances, the confiscation of the firearm may be immediate
'Jr following an initial investigation. Whether the firearm is confiscated will
sometimes depend on a recommendation made by the investigating officer. In
response to the e-mail survey one of the areas for instance stated that the matter is
investigated. If the allegation is found to be positive, the members firearm is
confiscated and the member is charged with a criminal offence or departmental
steps are taken against him. One of the obstacles to investigation, even where
threats have been made against a family member, is sometimes that the person is
reluctant to make a statement for fear of jeopardising the member' source of
livelihood.
Where firearms are confiscated it appears that the member is frequently still
permitted to make use of a firearm while on duty. Thus, in relation to a question
regarding firearm misconduct off GULY, four or the Areas and two of the Provinces
which replied to tile e-mail su.: ey indicated that members would only be denied
use of the firearm while off du•.. Thus for instance one of the Areas replied that
"this office requests the commanding officer to revoke his firearm when the
member goes off duty until the criminal case is .lnalised." Another indicated that
" the members authority to possess a firearm after hours is also withdrawn in
serious cases." Another replied that "If clear grounds exists that the member has
misused his firearm, it will be confiscated and only issued when necessary, for
official duties in exceptional circumstances." Thus in addressing this issue it
appears that the Station Commander or investigator might also give consideration
to the member's work related responsibilities. If these invoh e high risk activities
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this might be taken into account in deciding whether or not to confiscate the
member's firearm.
Criminal or disciplinary proceedings therefore may have been instituted against the
member. One of the consequences of allegation of criminal activity against the
member may be that the member is suspended from his duties. One interviewee
said that if a member is suspended his or her firearm will automatically be
confiscated. Furthermore a member, whether or not his firearm has been
temporarily confiscated, may be subjected to an inquiry in terms of the Arms and
Ammunition Act.
Person declared unfit to possess firearms and other circumstances leading to
permanent confiscation (If firearm
As indicated (see Chapter 5, Section 1) the current Arms and Ammunition Act
defines certain circumstances and procedures in terms of which a person may be
disqualified from owning a firearm. The Act provides for a person to be declared
not fit to possess a firearm either by a court (it is not clear to what extent courts
may do this where a person is acquitted of an offence) or by a Police
Commissioner. According to some of responses to the e-mail survey, in some cases
the Commander do this on the instructions of the Province or Area Commissioner.
If a member is declared unfit to possess a firearm this is likely to have serious
consequences for his or her career. One interviewee indicated that this type of
measure was not something that was frequently considered in the SAPS. If the
SAPS "wanted to go to that extreme" he said, the matter would have to be sent for
a legal opinion as it would have serious implications if the member was
subsequently injured on duty. In general such members are likely to be placed in
an administrative post pending the commander's report in respect of the future
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deployment of the member. A board intended to establish whether the member is
fit to remain in the service, in terms of sect 34 of the SAPS Act, will also be
considered. 73
Consequences of loss of firearms
Loss of a firearm is to some extent also governed by the provisions of the Arms
and Ammunition Act. A member who negligently loses a firearm may be guilty of
a criminal offence and may be declared unfit to possess a firearm and might also
face disciplinary action. According to one interviewee, if a member loses his
firearm repeatedly, even if the facts do not show that he or she has been negligent,
the member may not be permitted to carry a firearm off duty.
Discussion: The disarmament debate
As indicated (see Chapter 2) police suicides are frequently associated with violence
against another person. Withdrawal of the service weapon should be one of the
steps promptly taken where a member displays nut only suicide risk behaviour but
other behaviour pointing to a risk of violence against other people. Not only in
circumstances where a member is alleged to have committed an offence where
urearms, or violence was used or threatened, but also in relation to suicide or
violence risk behaviour more generally, a members firearm(s) should be
withdrawn. Not unly should the service pistol be withdrawn but he or she should
Apparently the AJTI1Sand Ammunition Act provides for applications to be made for person
declared unfit to possess a firearm to have this declaration reviewed. One response indicated that
where 11 members services were retained, such an application would be submitted to Head Office
after 2 years.
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also be compelled to hand in any firearms privately owned. Whether or not
criminal charges are instituted against the member a full internal investigation
should be entered into.
An important issue concerns the rigorousness with which questions, relating to the
suitability of members to be in possession of firearms, both on and off duty, are
addressed. It would appear that in many of the circumstances outlined above
members of the SAPS would effectively qualify to have a declaration that they are
unfit to posses a firearm made against them. Procedures may however vary from
informal ones, to temporary withdrawal of the firearm (possibly only while the
member is off duty), to criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings, and/or a section
12 or 11 declaration. Frequently it appears that where members have their
firearms confiscated this is only on a temporary basis and only affects their access
to firearms while off duty.
Even if the member is convicted of an offence, such as culpable homicide, it would
appear that the fact of whether or not he or she is declared unfit will depend firstly
on whether he is declared unfit to own a firearm by the court, and failing this,
whether departmental steps are instituted to have the member declared unfit to own
a firearm, Pending this, even if a member is convicted of a firearm related offence,
he (.'1' she may continue to have access to a firearm, possibly only on duty, but
potentially even on the station, or 108 issue. Particularly if, for instance the
prosecution decides not to proceed with charges against the member, it may be
unlikely that departmental steps will be entered into and nothing may end up being
done.
Ultimately however what may be the key issue here concerns the 108 and station
issue systems. Despite what appeal's to have been an apparent retreat from it during
the mid- 1990s, it appears that .he 108 system remains as the status quo. While
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there are serious risks to police officers in South Africa these appear to derive as
much from the fact that they are in full-time possession of firearms as any
vulnerability which they may be exposed to if they are not. As Van Rensburg
suggests, while the 108 issue system has something of the status of a "holy cow"
it is also an anachronism that has simply been absorbed into current procedure
without critical attention. Focussing on police suicides in the Northwest he points
out that every single one of these was committed with a service pistol. At the same
time "everyone of these persons was off duty where there was no reason to have
a firearm available". (1998, p. 236). This links to another apparently problematic
aspect of the responsibilities of SAPS members. As suggested in Section 5, and
discussed further in Section 7, an issue in relation to which there is a great demand
for policy clarification is the expectation that SAPS member are available to "place
themselves on duty" at any time. As long as this expectation remains it will be
difficult to tamper with the status of the 108 issue as the SAPS's "holy cow". 74
In concluding this section it is perhaps appropriate to return to two issues
concerning the availability of equipment:
• The one issue concerns the avaialibility of equipment that is relevant to the
safety of police officers. While most killings of police officers occur off
duty, in the region of one third do occur on duty. A crucial question
concerns what level of improvement in the safety of members can be
brought about by improving their equipment. In addition to bullet proof
vests the one example which appears particularly relevant is that of two
way radios. It is fair to ask to what extent problems with the availability of
radios adds to the vulnerability which members are exposed to?
• The other issue concerns the availability of intermediate weapon" to SAPS
members. As indicated in Chapter 3, it has been suggested that improving
74 Regarding the issuing of firearms to police sec Satre (1996) for examples of variations iupolicy
ill different Australian jurisdictions.
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the ability of police officers to use LTL force may assist in reducing the
use of lethal force. The current status of the tonfa in the SAPS has the
regrettable consequence that the majority of SAPS members have no access
to an effective LTL weapon. As long as this continues to be the case,
management of the use of force in the SAPS will continue to be primarily
about dealing with the often devastating implications of the dependence by
SAPS members on firearms.
7 System of operational command in situations of potential and
actual use of force
As indicated in Section 1 of Chapter 3 a key distinguishing feature of the work of
the police, and the use afforce, is its "low visibility" from a managerial point of
view .. How police deal with situations generally is therefore in some ways
discretionary (though this should not be taken to mean that they can always
"determine" whether they become involved in use of force situations).
Furthermore incidents of the use of force are unpredictable in terms of when they
occur and, particularly when they involve the use of'lethal force, do not necessarily
occur on a regular basis According to one interviewee, for instance, in 14 years
in the SAP and SAPS he had been involved in 3 shooting incidents. Iincldents of
the use of LTL or intermediate force are likely to be far more frequent but are
themselves, for many police not necessarily, frequent occurrences. At one
suburban station the commander for instance, estimated that members at that
station combined would tend to be involved in incidents where some level of
physical force was used 2 or 3 times a week. These might involved, for instance
arresting a chunk, an illegal immigrant, a person whose stolen or broken into a car,
or intervening in a domestic violence incident.
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In general, whatever their frequency, it is not possible to predict when situations
which may require the use afforce (or skill in avoiding the use afforce) may arise
and therefore there is little scope for supervisors or managers to issue instructions
relating to them. As one interviewee said "to prejudge the situation is difficult.
You might have an ordinary assault case and one simply wants to take a statement
from the person. Because the police approach him he becomes abusive and the
situation gets out of hand."
. may thus be suggested that it is inappropriate to talk of issues of operational
command in relation to the use of force in general. However there would appear
to be certain ways in which issues of operational command - where decisions or
instructions relating to the use of force are made by a member other than the
member directly involved in the use of force - do come into play in relation to the
use of force.
Public order policing and large scale operations
Thus for instance the Public Order Police generally operate in terms of a highly
defined command structure. The same may apply where other police units are
engaged in public order policing activities or other large scale operations.
Furthermore the process of preparing for such operations provides an opportunity
for commanders to address issues to do with the use of force. In this connection
one station commander said during briefings regarding the Objectives of the
operation "I always address the issue of the use of force. Senior management has
a responsibility to highlight these issues before we go out on operation".
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Anticipating possible violence
In certain situations it is possible to identify the fact that there is a direct risk of
violence. According to one interviewee detectives may at times, for instance, face
this type of situation, for instance if you are going to arrest a known bank robber.
Particularly if one has knowledge before hand that the person is aggressive or
violent, or that a number of people may be involved extra precautions can be taken
to deal with, or avert, the risk of violence. Such situations therefore allow for a
certain level of planning and therefore potentially a certain level of operational
command to be applied.
Support by colleagues or "back-up"
Within the SAPS, and many police services, there is a generalised practise
whereby members call for "back-up" in situations where they perceive a need for
support. Interestingly here, in so far as there is a system of operational command
at work, it is in some ways one where the "front line" member is the one who
makes the decisions, at least in respect of calling for support.
There appear to be no written guidelines on when such calls for help are
appropriate." Whetl.r+ a member calls for help will therefore depends on his or
her own assessment of the situation. According to One interviewee a member will
ask for assistance where he "sees that he is in a situation that he can't handle
himself". This might be a situation that calls for a certain level of skill, such as an
argument in a home. Thus it might be appropriate to call for the assistance of
someone who may be abi, t'l deal with a situation, for example, more
75 A further issue which was not explored for this report is to what extent issues to do with "back-
up" arc covered in training curriculums.
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diplomatically, and not purely because one needs the support of more physical
muscle or firepower. The interviewee added "if he calls for assistance he s
professional enough to know that he needs assistance. I never had a situation of
someone telling me 'you should have handled this yourself'" .
Other situations where support is called for might include a vehicle pursuit.
According to another interviewee in such a situation "we will always try to first
get the back-up car with this car before we pull a car off". Here rather than one of
the members in the veh.cle being in charge they "will each act on their own
initiative" but" talk to each other about how they are going to act". Even if the
member arriving as back-up is a more senior member "it's always best to consider
the i- car at the scene to be in charge. The pl car at the scene - it's his scene" he
said.
While the system of providing back-up is often useful in many situations events
may unfold too quickly or members may be unable to call in support for other
reasons (such as the lack of two-way radios). In such a situation a member's only
support will be from his or her partner. While on-duty police in South Africa
generally work in pairs partly because of the risk of attacks.
Off-duty police
The support of one's partner and other colleagues may not however be available
when one is off duty. As Geller and Scott state,
"Police officers traditionally have considered their responsiblity for off-
duty action to include aggressive intervention (termination of crime and
arrest of suspects) and not just careful observation and notification of on-
duty police. The arming of off-o ity police.. facilitates such aggressive
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action, But police frequently are at a tactical disadvantage while off duty,
being out of radio communication with other officers and usually not
having the opportunity to plan a course of action as they travel to a
suspected crime scene. Nor do off-duty officers have the Same perceived
legitimacy to intervene that on-duty officers have when they are summoned
to a disturbance by a civilian complaint. ... Moreover, off-duty officers
who happen to be socialising in a tavern when armed robbers enter may be
in no condition to outdraw the holdup men, yet the presumed imperative to
take police action may prompt an ill-advised confrontation" (1991, p, 460).
In South Africa, as in many other countries, there is a generalised expectation that
police members will "place themselves on duty" whenever they encounter a crime
in progress. In terms of considerations of police safety as well as a concern to
prevent inappropriate police action it would appear to be appropriate that this
expectation be revisited at the policy level.
8. Review mechanisms - the investigation and monitoring of
shooting incidents and other uses of force
The investigation of shooting incidents in terms of Standing Order 251
(a) Standing Order 25]
Standing Order 251 provides, inter alia, that:
• Following a shooting incident a member must promptly report the matter
to his immediate commander;
• That a member of officer rank should be immediately notified by the
commander, if such a member was not present at the time of the incident,
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so that he or she can visit the scene to investigate the circumstances of the
shooting;
.. That a full factual shooting incident report (SIR) under 32 specified
headings should then be submitted; and
• That while the commander may conduct the investigation if an officer (Of
officer rank) is not available, in specified circumstances of a serious nature,
such an officer must stilI visit the scene and verify the investigation that has
been c-mducted;
Effectively therefore it is only actually mandatory that a member of officer rank
attend the scene in these specified circumstances which are:
• where a person has been killed or injured;
• property seriously damaged;
.. where the events reveal the unjustified use of a firearm andlor its reckless
or negligent handling;
where the events "cause particular public interest or are of such a nature
that Head Office ought to be informed. 76
As indicated in Section 2 as far as could be ascertained the term "duty officer"
appears to have different connotations attached to it in different areas. In one areas
it refers to station based members of officer rank (possibly including the Station
Commander) tasked with investigating shooting incidents. In this area the duty
officers based at the station are also tasked to investigate shootings in their station
areas involving units such as the Flying Squad, Dog Unit, or Highway Patrol. In
another area it appeared to refer to a merr.'ier of officer rank based at the area radio
control who stands in for the Station commander or other station based personnel
when they are off duty (at night), Standing Order 251 also does not refer to a
76 The implication in several ofthe provisions therefore is that an evaluation needs 10 be made by
the member's commander in order for the OJ ricer to be called to the scene.
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"duty officer". It is not enurely clear therefore to what extent the position of duty
officer and his or her involvement in the investigation of shooting incidents is a
characteristic of certain areas or a standardised practise throughout the SAPS.
Furthermore while SO 251 specifies that a member of officer rank must attend the
scene and investigate it does Hot snecify that this person must complete the
shouting incident report. It is therefore not entirely clear to what 'ytent the
specified officer who is called to the scene also .ends to be the person who
compiles the SIR.
If one interprets SO 251 to the letter it would therefore appear that it allows a
degree of flexibility in its application. Furthermore we cannot assume that in all
areas even the unambiguous aspects of SO 251 are rigorously followed. Out of the
14 responses received from SAPS Area offices, 12 (86 %) exp..cltly answered yes
to the question "Are copies of all shooting incident reports from stations in your
area submitted to your [Area] office?". Only one Area gave a negative answer to
the question indicating that "at some of the shooting incidents no officer visited the
scene and therefore J1e shooting report was not cornpilec On other cases members
involved do not report to their station immedlately.?" According to the vast
majority of responses received to the e-mail survey the system for reporting of
shooting incidents is functioning entirely smoothly in the SAPS. Other evidence
(see for instance Bruce and O,Malley, 1999) suggests that this is not necessarily
the case.
7: One Area did not answer the question directly.
111
(b) Processing of Shooting Incident Reports
According to the responses received to the t -mail survey it appears that, with a
greater or Jesser degrees of variation in many areas, where SIRs are completed
they are processed roughly I.S follows:
.. Where they are submitted to the Area office this may be to the "Nodal
Point" or another component.
II The SIR is then passed on to someone in the (Negative) Discipline or other
representative of t'1ePersonnel (or Human Resource Management) section
and/or to a representative of the Legr l Services section. The responsibility
for review of the shooting incident report therefore may fall on either a
representative of the (Negative) Discipline section or of Legal Services.
Sometimes for instance the (Negative) Discipline person may check the
report and if there is an indication that the shooting was unlawful or needs
a legal input may consult with the legal section. The Negative Discipline
section may then give instructions regarding further steps to be taken
including for instance further investigation of the incident.
.. In many areas the SIR may lead to a /5 file (a disciplinary tile) being
opened. In some areas this will be automatic while in other areas this will
be only if the SIR alleges unlawful behaviour.
" A copy may also be referred to social work services (or other compc mt
concerned) for the purposes of notifying the social worker regarding the
need to debrief the member.
• A copy may also be referred to the Provincial Commissioners office.
• If a member from another area (or station) is involved there may also be
issues concerning informing the member's commander.
In general therefore the Area office, usually as represented by the (Negative)
Discipline section has to evaluate whether there are any discrepancies or other
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problems with the report and whether grounds existed for use of a firearm. If the
answer to the fatter question is in the negative the office also needs to see to it that
criminal or departmental steps are instituted if this bas not already been done.
Fairly frequently it appears that the major problem is that the report is unclear and
the office may then cal [ in the member involved or the member who compiled the
report to clarity matters. Where it appears that there has been nothing irregular
about the incident the file is then closed and an entry to this effect entered on the
control register (where such registers exist).
According to an interviewee the main purpose of processing the SIR at area level
is to evaluate "whether it has been dealt with appropriately in relation to whether
the shooting was justified or not justified". The process at area level is therefore
intended to serve as a check on the actions of the duty officer or other member
who investigated the incident at the scene.
M If tile shooting incident is believed to have been unlawful
At 15.5.2.8., SO 251 indicates that the SIR must indicate whether the police
member's actions were "legal, or not (if doubtful this should be specifically
mentioned)" . One of the interviewees emphasised that such an indication could not
be taken as a final judgement on the guilt of the member(s) involved. "Effectively
it is an administrative decis'on as to whether or 110tto open a criminal case against
the member" he said. Another interview indicated that this should be regarded as
a " preliminary finding regarding whether the shooting was justified or not" .
Where the duty officer decides that a shooting has been unlawful he or she should
initiate the process of opening a criminal case. It would appear that again in this
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regard practise may vary. If a criminal investigation is to be conducted therefore
the Internal Investigation Unit, or detectives from the station to which the member
belongs, may be called in for this purpose. If a person is killed, the SAPS Act
requires that the leD be called. Where a person is killed, if there Is no preliminary
finding of unlawfulness, an inquest rather than a criminal docket must be opened ..
According to one of the responses to the e-mail survey if the incident is believed
to have been unlawful both a criminal case and a disciplinary" investigation for the
purpose of departmental steps" are conducted. In addition consideration is given
to having the member declared unfit to possess a firearm in terms of the Arms and
Ammunition Act. Another area response indicated that "a notice of contemplated
suspension would be served on the member" and by this time "a members firearms
would normally have been taken away by his Commander either on own initiative
or on instructions from [the area] office".
According to one of the interviewees however the way in which the investigation
is conducted and evaluated may frequently be characterised by a "protectionist
attitude" particularly if it is perceived that the member was acting within the scope
of employment. "Unless it is a clear cut case of murder, they will try and protect
him as far as possible" he said. In addition, there may be a risk of the scene
having been tampered with. As another interviewee put it " a lot can happen before
he [the duty officer] gets to the scene".
Replies to the question "Would there be circumstances where issues relating to
particular shootings would be taken up with SOmeoneoutside your office?" mostly
indicated that where this occurred this would involved referring the case to either
the Deputy Public Prosecutor, or Internal Investigating Unit or detective
responsible for investigating the case, or the Independent Complaints Directorate,
or the Station Commander of the member in question in relation to the need to
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institute disciplinary steps. Effectively therefore where such incidents are "taken
up with someone outside the office' other than when this is for the purpose of
clarifying the report, this is almost exclusively in relation to the prospect of further
steps of a criminal or disciplinary nature.
;n a few instances responses indicated that the member might also be referred to
the State Attorney. Thus according to one of the responses from a Provincial office
the SIR might be referred to the State Attorney in order to assist member to
compile statements "tor the investigations authority". This would only apply to
members involved in incidents in execution of their duties. "Normally this is
where there is presumption that member has overstepped legal boundaries."
Another response indicated that if the member requires assistance with making a
statement for the purposes of an inquest, or other legal advice, then he is referred
to the area office. "If it appears that it is in the interests of the state to assist the
member, then such assistance is given. If not, due to aconflict or potential conflict
of interest, then he is advised to see his own attorney".
(d) Cooperation by police officers with Sf investigations and the right to
remain silent
One interviewee said that he could not recall an incident "of a guy refusing to
speak to the officer completing the shooting incident report" . However at 15.4, SO
251 provides that on arriving at the scene the Commander or other senior member
must warn the person who fired the shot "in accordance with the Judge's rules"
before he questions him, The shooter is therefore not actually compelled to make
a statement about the shooting. One station commander said that the shooter "has
right to call lawyer from legal services a area level. Sometimes you will go to a
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scene and will advise the constable that "I think there will be a problem" and that
he should speak to lawyer" .
(e) Records of shooting incidents
In different areas it appears that different systems for recording shooting incidents
are used. Sometimes areas make use of more than one of the following systems.
" A number of responses indicated that they made use of a "register"
a As indicated "in section 2 the SAPS has a national database, the PERSAP
system, for recording of data from SIRs. However only a minority of
responses made reference to PERSAP. One area indicated that they had no
access to the PERSAP system as " the terminals were deactivated and not
replaced. Thus no registering can currently take place".
o Others indicated that records were kept through the /5 file system. One
area indicated that these files were numbered. so that a person could "with
a glance perceive the number of shooting incidents the members were
involved in" .
In addition to being filed at the Area the report may also be filed at the station. At
one station the commander indicated that the station maintained a general file for
SIRs. The tile is also used by logistics to check up on ammunition which must be
replaced. It also means that the shooting incident is available for instance to the
duty officer if he or she is called to court to lead evidence.
Another station commander indicated that copies of the report would be placed
both m the relevant case docket and in the members file at the station.
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Investigation of deaths in police custody or as a result of'police action by the ICD
Another measure which provides for the review of uses of force is ss53(2)(b) of
the South African Police Services Act, 58 of 1995. Sub-section 53(2)(b) provides
that the lCD must investigate all deaths in police custody or as a result of police
action, "Deaths as a result of police aL.<l.m" are also usually the result of shootings
by members of the SAPS. It would appear that the focus of the lCD and thus
ss53(2)(b) investigations is also primarily on issues of legality. In particular,
Section 222 of the Interim Constitution, the provision in terms of which the rCD
was originally established, indicates that the purpose of the rCD is to ensure that
"offences and misconduct allegedly committed by members of the Service are
investlgated in an effective and efficient marner" (italics added).
Incident Investigations in the Public Order Policing Services
As is the case with all components of the SAPS, if the Public Order Police are
involved in a shooting incident an investigation will also be conducted in terms of
SO 251. However the POP also make use of another system of incident
investigation which is not provided for in terms of formal policy documents but
implemented in terms of the obligations of the National Head of Public Order
Police to investigate the fur-itioning of the POP and operations in which they are
involved.
The National Head therefore has a discretion to decide whether or not an incident
needs to be investigated. Investigations will generally be conducted where the
National Head thinks there is an irregularity or where it appears that there was a
departure from the policy of the POP. The Commissioner may therefore authorise
such an investigation in cases where it appears that force was used inappropriately,
not used when it should have been, or where it appears that insufficient force was
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used. In certain circumstances the force used may be lawful but the person
conducting the investigation may be able to say, out of their experience, that "if
you used this or this or this option you could have got a better result". The
investigation therefore potentially applies judgements based on skill and experience
and does not only use legal standards.
Where the Commissioner calls for an incident investigation, the unit in question
will have to complete a report. If that is not sufficient, another person may be
appointed to conduct the investigation. During some of the irwestigations a
debriefmg format is used in evaluating whether an action was appropriate. The
result of these investigations may be used to adapt training programmes or even
policy with a view to improving the effectiveness of the POPS.
Mechanisms to identify stations or members linked to a high number of shootings
In response to the question in the e-mail survey "does your office ever look at
trends in shooting incidents (e.g. to identify stations with high shooting levels,
comparing one year to another)?" ten of the fifteen areas answered that they did
not and four (27%) indicated that they have some such mechanism in place.
Of these four areas, one indicated that "the statistics are compared with the
previous year and individually as well. The raft. if shootings is also compared to
the ratio of crime and incidents reported during a specific period". The other
positive responses appeared to indicate that whatever mom taring of stations was
undertaken was fairly informal. One indicated that shooting levels at stations were
compared on an "informal basis" emphasising that "due to differing manpower at
station levels a raw figure is not an accurate reflection". Another response was that
the" shooting register is perused by the Area Commissioner on a regular basis and
he draws the attention of the Station Commander or Unit Commander to the high
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incidence of the use of force if applicable". One Provincial response also indicated
that Area Commissioners do take "remedial steps" where stations are identified as
having a high number of shooting instances as well as a high number of civil and
criminal cases arising from shooting incidents. "These steps include comprehensive
training lectures by Legal Services at Area level regarding the use of force" .
In response to the question "Are shooting incident reports ever analysed from the
point of view of identifying members who appear to be involved in a particular
high number of shootings?" seven areas answered in the negative while eight
(53 %) indicated that they did have such systems in place. However in most of the
latter cases the responses indicated steps which might be taken if such members
were identified without clearly indicating how such identification took place. The
few which indicated how such identification took place appeared to mainly rely on
the /5 tile for this purpose. One said "This is the reason why incident reports are
tiled on the individual members /5 tile. A general file will not enhance individual
control or identification of certain behavioural trends".
In relation to situations where members were identified who were involved in an
apparently high number of (lawful) sicctings one area indicated that the "current
Area Instruction is that when a specific member has more than three shooting
incidents in a year, the member is interviewed by Legal C. ices and then tested
by Psychological services to determine if a problem exists and to evaluate his or
her state of mind. The two divisions compile reports which are filed on the
member's /5 tile for further reference". In a number of other areas it was also
indicated that the member might be interviewed by the Area Commissioner or the
Station commander. In other areas it was indicated that steps taken would take the
form of an investigation after which the member might be interviewed and dealt
with by means of disciplinary measures such as an oral or written warning, or sent
for "remedial measures" such as the help of social or psychological services, or
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the member might be transferred to another post. Insome areas it appeared that the
member would however have to have been involved in for instance" a high number
of shooting incidents which also includes unlawful reports" for any action to be
taken.
In another area it was indicated that while no systematic analysis took place, it had
occasionally happened that members were identified who were involved in an
exceptionally high number of shootings and who were "transferred to places where
they were less likely to be involved in shootings". Two responses, one from a
Provincial office, indicated that the identification of members of this kind was
actually a responsibility of the members Station or unit commander. The area
office said that where however it noticed problems of this kind it would be taken
up with the members corm. anding officer "who has to inform members that he is
jeopardising his career in the SAPS". The Provincial office said that "if the
member is involved in a number of unjustified shooting incidents, an Article 11 (of
the Arms and Ammunition Act) investigation is requested by this office from the
area office".
Discussion - systems of review of the use of force in the SAPS
Those evaluating the system of shooting incident investigation in terms of SO 251
might be inclined to focus on questions regarding the integrity of the system. If
they are inclined to be suspicious of the police they might even be inclined to see
the system as nothing but an elaborate system for covering up abuses of force by
the police. It should be borne in mind however (see Chapter 2) that a certain
proportion of these investigations do in fact declare the shooting to have been
unlawful, though this happens more frequently where shootings occur off duty.
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Whatever the truth may be about the integrity of these investigations what is
apparent is that investigations under SO 251 never address behaviour other than
that which, in Geller and Tech's words "merits punitive responses". While
Standing Order 251 provides that the shooting incident report should contain detail
on a number of questions, the report is ultimately concerned with whether the
shooters actions "were legal or not" (at 15.5.2.8).78 Investigations ty the lCD, in
terms (If ss53(2)(b) are similarly focussed on issues of legality. 79
However approaches taken to incident investigation within the SAPS are not
uniform in this respect. In particular the Public Order Police make use of a system
of incident investigation which evaluates incidents partly in terms of standards of
skill Of experience. In addition to being instructive for those who are involved in,
and those whose actions are the subject of, the investigation, these investigations
may be used to feed into modification of POP policy regarding the use of force by
members or into the improvement of training programmes.
Other than in the Public Order Police, instead of constructive criticism or advice,
all that members ever face, particularly where they are involved in shooting
incidents, is a type of double jeopardy. In terms of the requirements of the job he
or she must act. As soon as he or she has done so, where such action involved
shooting a firearm, he or she will be faced with an inquiry whose sole purpose is
Even w:.";..; "remedial" rather than disciplinary measures are applied following a SO 251
inve,\t'~;lll.)n it appears that these may focus on the issue of legal standards, Thus one area
indicated that "remedial" measures would be likely to be instituted where "it is necessary to
explain the national instruction regarding the use of force to a member' ,
79 It may legitimately be asked ~,L,thel SO 251 investigations, or investigations conducted by the
reo in terms of ss53(2)(b) 1'0; tid! matter, are not therefore essentially criminal investigations
ratherthan processes of administrative review. There isnota watertight distinction betweenthese
two types of processes. However to a large degree these types of processes primarily serve the
purpose of confirming that most of the incidents in question are not criminal, To some extent
where evidence of criminality is uncovered these investigations lead to a criminal investigation
being initiated, rather: han themselves constituting such an investigation (see the discussion in
Section 10 regarding uses of force declared to be unlawful).
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to discover whether he or she acted criminally or not. As a result of the inquiry he
or she will either be cast as a hero or a villain.
As is the case in criminal investigations, police members in SO 251 investigations
may make use of a right to remain silent The report notes the fact that, at least in
the experience of one interviewee, members rarely if ever make use of this right.
In a certain sense it would therefore appear that members usually cooperate with
SO 251 investigations. However this is to miss the point. If one is faced with an
enquiry where the only options are either to be caste as the hero or the villain of
the piece one will be ill-advised not to be cautious about what one says. Rather
than making use of the opportunity to analyse and evaluate one's handling of the
situation one is virtually compelled to give a one-dimensional narrative of events
which focuses purely on emphasising the degree to which one's actions were
legally and otherwise justified.
Referring to the example of dog units who are called to serious crime scenes one
of the responses to the e-mail survey notes that "there are also members who,
because of the type of function they perform, are more prone to be jnvolved in
shooting incidents". It is true that police officers who are allocated to certain units
or assignments might be more likely to encounter situations where there is the
potential (need) for the use of force.
It is also true however that some police officers may deal with si.rh situatlons
effectively while at the same time minimising the need for force to be used, while
others may inevitably escalate the situation. But as one interviewees, a staff
member in one of the SAPS legal sections involved extensively with the review of
SO 151 reports, indicated "a lot of unlawful shootings don't come down to
criminal intent but to a lack of experience". Police officer who use force ill
advisedly might therefore for instance be well motivated, but ill-experienced,
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officers who lacks understanding of the potential for carrying out their work while
minimising levels of violence. But SO 251 is of little help to the inexperienced
member 01 to members generally "\V ho seek to conduct themselves in terms of the
law other than in that it, generally, serves to confirm that they are not criminals.
In responding to the question regarding the review of trends at stations one of the
Provincial offices responded that these trends are evaluated by "obtaining statistics
from the computer and discussing it at the Provincial Disciplinary Committee".
However they said "If all or most of the incidents wen, j"3ti."ied the committee will
just take note of it. If not the committee will decide on steps to be instituted. " What
this points to is the fact that the legally orientated framework which is dominant
in the SAPS fails to provide adequate tools for proper critical evaluation even of
levels of shootings which are cause for real concern.
A positive sign is that in some areas some attention is given to the issue of
identifying members who appear to be linked to a relatively high number of
shooting incidents. Where measures do not involve disciplinary procedures or
reprimands they way involved "educational steps" but these it seems are only ever
focused on explaining the law. At other times members may be referred to SAPS
psychologists or social services. In such cases therefore the presumption is that
something may be "wrong" with the officer. While this might be the case what
appears never to be considered is that part of the problem may be the inadequacy
of the framework which the SAPS uses for evaluating uses of force.
One estimate, based on recorded shooting incidents in three provinces, is that
SAPS members are involved in over 6 000 shooting incidents per year (Bruce and
O'Malley, 1999, p. 21). Where shooting incidents are dealt with in terms of the
formal procedures of the SAPS a significant organisational process is set in
motion. This organisational energy could, it would appear, be used far more
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productively but for this to happen the SAPS will need to develop new frameworks
for review.
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9. Systems for providing support to policeofficers suffering the
consequences of stress and exposure to traumatic incidents
General role played by the helping professions
In 1999 the "helping professions" in the SAPS consisted of about 350 members
including 87 psychologists, 170 social workers and about 90 members of the
chaplaincy services. While there arc now psychologists and/or social workers in
all areas in Gauteng, this is unfortunately not the case in the rest of South Africa
despite a significant effort in recent years to decentralise staff.
The role of the members of the helping professions has already been alluded to in
previous sections such as that dealing with selection (section 4), that dealing with
the issuing of firearms to SAPS members (section 6) and the section on review
(section 8). Very broadly the role played by the helping professions in contributing
to the management of the use of force is through the operation of various systems
of support for members of the SAPS. These include:
• The development of systems for the training of Employee Assistance
Programme (EAP) "practitioners" equipped to identify occupational "risk
factors" (such as low productivity, alcohol abuse, high levels of aggression)
and initiate interventions (in this regard see Schoeman, 1998).
• Training aimed at the development of peer support systems - focuses on
support· structures available to police with an emphasis on the ability of
colleagues to help each other indealing with difficulties experienced in the
work environment. Intended to improve the ability of colleagues to deal
with stress, conflict, and interpersonal or group dynamics including issues
of diversity and transformation.
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A 24 hour crisis line is also staffed by members of the national office. However
a person needing psychological counselling will generally be referred out to
another professional (this can be paid for by the police medical aid). While the
helping professions do also provide general support to members or their families
the focus of the helping professions is primarily on proactive work including
training, evaluation (see Section 4), and debriefing
Critical incident debriefing
The system for providing trauma - or critical incident - debriefings to SAPS
members involve all three helping professions in working together. A standardised
model is used which aims to create a safe environment where person can express
negative feelings. Debriefings may be conducted on a group or individual basis
with the ideal being that a debriefing session take place within 48 hours of the
traumatic incident. The debriefing is therefore a once off event but a need for
further support may be identified at the briefing session. Emphasis is also given
to the debriefing of debriefing staff.
SAPS national instructions now require that traumatised persons, such as those
involved in shooting incidents, be referred to social work services or other person
responsible for debriefing. While the person referred does have a choice as to
whether to make use of the service, there has been a major increase in the number
of debrietings. III 1997 for instance the SAPS did 5329 debriefings. One rough
estimate is that 70 % of debriefings have been for members who for instance have
attended crime scenes or vehicle accidents, had a colleague killed or themselves
been shot at. Possibly 30% of debriefings therefore have been for incidents where
members have primarily been involved in the use of .orce (rather than the target
of violence).
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Particularly since about 1998 strong emphasis has been given to publicising the
fact that there will be no negative consequences attached to use of the helping
professions. In certain situations however this may create something of a "Catch
22" situation for the staff involved as members may disclose behaviour or
information which strictly should be drawn to the attention of their commanders.
Where these situations arise the approach taken is that helping profession staff
should try and convince the member to raise the issue with the appropriate person.
At this stage there are in the region of 350 trained debriefers of whom nearly 300
are helping profession staff. The programme is also looking into the possibility of
using members, particularly those in high risk units, to be the firstline debriefers.
Discussion - systems of SllPP01t and the paradox of the problem officer
In looking at the issue of police officers who misuse force it is necessary to
acknowledge that these may extend along a continuum from "officers with a
horrendous problem" to "clearly non-problem officers" (Toch, 1996; p, 96). While
the personal profiles and motivations of these police officers are not necessarily
uniform it is not infrequently a characteristic of such police officers that they are
in many ways highly committed to what they perceive, possibly in fairly crude
terms, to be the objectives of the police organisation. While their approach to
encounters with citizens "leads to escalation of conflict" (p. 98) they may not
necessarily be corrupt police officers - who cynically use the authority conferred
on them for personal aggrandisement - but might for instance see themselves as
dedicated crime fighters .
While the psychological profile of officers of this kind is not uniform some of them
may, for instance, be driven by a need for approval or lack of self esteem, and may
respond to social pressures within the police organisation in terms of which "the
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willingness and ability to handle physical conflict are requisites for peer
acceptance" (p. 102). Other officers may become involved in violence because they
have "limited verbal or interpersonal skills" (p. 104) and therefore feel unable to
assert authority other than through violence. Whatever t:1eunderlying causes Toch
suggests that one option may be to "assist the person to gain insight into his or her
patterns of violence and help the person discover or invent a different mode of
response to situations in which he or she reacts violentIy"(p. 108).
For this to be possible however depends firstly on such officers being identified
and secondly on their managing or being assisted to recognise that their behaviour
is not only unacceptable in terms of organisational policy, but also ultimately may
undermine their own interests. If this is possible there may be scope for deepening
tile proactive violence prevention role of the helping professions by focussing on
developing programmes orientated towards dealing with officers manifesting
violence risk behaviour both in thei. ~-p,rsonallives as well as On an occupational
level. If, as was suggested in section 8, systems of trend identification are utilised
more effectively, the ability of the SAPS to identify problem officers may be
strengthened.
Where systems are established which can identify risk behaviour and therefore
potentially lead to engagement with such officers at an early stage, programmes
and interventions by members of the helping professions may therefore be of val«,
in assisting such officers. Timely action in this regard may save not only careers
but lives, and contribute to the development of effective and professional police
officers.
However this option can only be considered where such officers, while their style
01 operating may lead them into violent confrontations, have not as yet committed
any, particularly serious, violations of the law. However in many cases it may be
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too late. Ultimately those who flagrantly and deliberately violate the law will need
to be dealt with through the legal and disciplinary system.
10. The SAPS complaints reception, internal investigative and
disciplinary systems"
Reception of complaints
In general complaints against SAPS members might either be complaints about
service delivery or complaints which relate to an alleged crime or misconduct
committed by a member. Complaints against SAPS members can be lodged in one
of the following ways:
• Interviewee's indicated that an officer is required to visit the cells every
day in order to ensure that the needs of those in the cells are taken care of.
If someone for instance complains that they have been assaulted the person
should be allowed to open a case.
.. Complaints can be lodged with the LCD. Inter alia the anti-torture policy
(see Section 1) provides that a register be completed in relation to each
person taken into custody. The register provides for an indication to be
given if the person has been assaulted and for the person in custody or
medical practitioner to notify the lCD regarding allegations of torture.
• A person who is not in custody may be able to lay a complaint at the charge
office.
II Complaints may also be lodged by letter, for instance by a person's
attorney, and, according to one interviewee, even by phone.
so For a more in depth review oIthe SAPS disciplinary system and problems being faced currently
see Newham (1999).
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Complaints against SAPS members relating to uses of force would generally
amount to an allegation that a member committed a criminal offence. They would
be likely at minimum to amount to an allegation of assault charge if not something
more serious.
Possible consequences of alleged unlawful use of force or firearm
(a) Criminal or disciplinary investigation and charges against member
A criminal investigation might therefore be initiated against a member in relation
to the use of force either because a complaint has been lodged by a member of the
public (see SO 101), or else due to an internal process such as a SO 251
investigation where it has been concluded that the member acted unlawfully. In
addition SO 143 provides that where a civil claim received by the SAPS amounts
to an allegation of assault, a docket should be opened.
As mentioned (see Section 8) in relation to shooting incidents declared to have
been unlawful, where a criminal investigation, is initiated procedures followed are
not necessarily uniform. The investigation may for instance be based at the station
or unit in question, or, particularly if it is more serious, be conducted by the
Internal Investigating Unit or other detectives or internal units. Furthermore where
the complaint is lodged with the lCD, the complaint may be dealt with either by
the lCD or by SAPS investigators as per lCD instructions. (Where the case is one
of a "death in police custody or as a result of police action the rCD is required, in
term" of ss53(2)(b) of the SAPS Act to carry out an investigation itself).
Where a person is killed the docket which is opened might be a murder or inquest
docket depending on the conclusions reached by the investigating member though
this decision can be changed.
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If the .uvestigation is of a disciplinary nature this is likely to be carried out, under
the instruction of the Station or unit commander following which a report will be
submitted to the disciplinary unit at area level. The present practi.se if for a
disciplinary investigation to run in parallel with the criminal investigation.
(b) Withdrawaloffireann
As indicated in Section 6 there may be a variety of circumstances where questions
concerning whether a member's firearm should be withdrawn will arise. As
indicated, in relation to alleged offences by members it appears that the issue will
primarily be regarded as relevant where it appears that someone was involved in
a shooting incident, or other incident of violence, which was not lawful. However
even in these circumstances it appears that such withdrawal is not mandatory or
automatic. Those responsible might still evaluate what steps to take in terms of, for
instance, the members current psychologically stability.
Where the fire-arm is withdrawn this should be at least until a full investigation has
been completed ..
(c) Suspension (see SO 106)
As is the case with the withdrawal of firearms the suspension of members is not
mandatory but is considered where a member faces criminal charges. A member
can only be suspended where the misconduct is regarded as serious. Beyond this
the key consideration should be "whether there is a need in terms of the interests
of the public or the service to relieve members of their powers as an official" while
other considerations which may be relevant would include whether the member is
likely to interfere with investigations if he or she is not suspended, the strength
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of the evidence against the member, the possibility of discharge., or the personal
circumstances of member.
The power to suspend has been delegated to area commissioners, In terms of
regulations whenever a person is suspended he must receive a salary. Here again
though there is a discretion regarding the seriousness of the case and other factors.
(d) Impact on possible promotion
If a member is facing criminal or disciplinary investigation this may result inany
promotion which was being considered being "held back".
(e) Criminal and/or disciplinary charges
The process of investigation may therefore lead to criminal andlor disciplinary
charges being placed against the member. Once a criminal investigation has been
initiated it is supposed to run its full course with the docket eventually being
submitted to the Deputy Public Prosecutor's (DPP's) office. The DPP may decide
to prosecute. Otherwise cases where a fatality is involved will be referred to the
inquest courts. In recent years allowance has also been made for "lesser cases"
(including not only assault but also GBH cases) to be referred to a Senior
Prosecutor.
Commanders would generally initiate disciplinary proceedings, Formal or informal
warnings would also be issued by the station commander but, where the matter
goes to a departmental trial, this is currently dealt with by disciplinary officials
based at the area level.
While in theory disciplinary proceedings can be completed prior to the completion
of a criminal case, where the latter case is proceeding there is a general tendency
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to delay disciplinary proceedings. Factors which appear to be behind this tendency
appear to be considerations relating to jeopardising the criminal trial as well as
considerations to do with witnesses such as not wishing, if possible, to put them
"through the same ordeal twice".
if) Dismissal
Where a dismissal is authorised this is usually by means of a disciplinary hearing. 81
Even where a member has been acquitted in a criminal case the departmental
prosecutor (disciplinary official) should still apply his or her mind independently
to the question of whether there is the prospect of the member being prosecuted
successfully at the departmental level. However departmental prosecutors may
sometimes be overly influenced by the fact that the criminal prosecution was
unsuccessful despite the fact that departmental prosecutions require a lower
standard (a balance of probabilities) of proof. At the same time, as one interviewee
emphasised one "always has always has to look at the reason for the failure of
criminal prosecution". Ultimately, he said, "one is still working with one incident,
one set of facts, one set of witnesses" and a witness who lacks credibility in a
.' . '(' ial court may be just as lacking in credibility in a disciplinary hearing."
&1 Section 36 of tile SAPS Act provides formembers to be automatically discharged on account of
being sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. It appears that members may also
be discharged by a section 34 enquiry.
82 Appeals against the findings of a disciplinary enquiry go to tile Independent Appeals Board.
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(g) Civil claims
Where civil claims are lodged against SAPS members these are dealt with by SAPS
legal services. Once the claim is settled, if the SAPS is held liable or accepts
liability the State Attorney should address the matter of whether the member
"forfeits" or "enjoys" state protection. The key question here is whether the
member acted within his or her duties and acted in good faith. If the member acted
outside of these standards he or she should forfeit state protection and the state may
exercise its right to recover the amount paid out from him or her. Statistics on the
April 1995 - March 1998 period indicate that in 96% of cases of common assault
and 98 % of shooting incidents in relation to which the SAPS made payments
against civil claims the SAPS members concerned were judged to enjoy state
protection (Bruce and O'Malley, 199, p. 49).
Disc ., '(11l - effective and appropriate measures against members who
de misuse force
.iationally, for a variety of reasons the prosecution of complaints against
Ice, not only at the departmental level, but also in the criminal courts, is
frequently unsuccessful (Maguire and Corbett, 1991, p. 37; Skolnick and Fyfe,
1993, pp. 196-197; Klockars, 1996, p. 3) This appears particularly to be the case
where these complaints are in the form of assault charges by arrested persons.
Even where independent investigative agencies are involved the rate of such
prosecutions is not necessarily higher (Perez and Muir).
But this should not obscure two important facts. The first is that police like all
other citizens are entitled to be treated fairly in terms of disciplinary or other
procedures against them. As Tach says this, therefore means that where officers
have accumulated "a long string of unsubstantiated charges" (p. 110) they must,
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where appropri ate still be given the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, where
there are substantial grounds for taking disciplinary action, or pressing criminal
charges against police officers, this should be done.
It is therefore important to draw a distinction between issues which primarily draw
attention to the need for support to the officer and actions which should have
disciplinary consequences. (In either type of situation the implication may be that
the police officer concerned should be deprived of his or her firearm/sj). Those
who deliberately abuse the capacity to use force should do S0 with the full
knowledge that this is disapproved of by the police organisation which they work
for and that in doing so they are placing their careers, and even . -ir freedom, in
jeopardy.
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Chapter 6 Main Findings And
Recommendations
Functioning of systems relevant to the management of the use offorce within the
SAPS
This report primarily concentrates 0," understanding the types of systems, relevant
to the management of the use of flrce, which are currently in place with the SAPS
and on evaluating issues relating to their operation. However the report does not
evaluate the degree to which the systems concerned are actually functioning in an
optimal manner. Some of the practises reflected in this report may reflect the status
quo in areas where systems for management of force are in fact functioning quite
well (or the opposite) and might not therefore reflect the general operation of these
systems throughout the SAP: .
Recommendation 1: An audit should be conducted w; .. \1 the SAPS in order to
evaluate to what extent systems relevant to the managenu ,u of the use of force are
operating in an optimal manner. Furthermore measures to e .sure contorrmrv with
minimum standards should be identified and implemented, and examples of good
practise should be publicised in the SAPS.
General characteristics of the management ofthe use of force within the SAPS
With the exception of specific divisions such as the training division the system for
the management of the use of force has a number of general characteristics. These
include:
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• Lack of a clearly defined and articulated policy:"
• Review processes purely evaluate the use of force in terms of legal
standards and issues of skill relating to the usc;of force, and in avoiding the
need to use force, are not addressed other than in training;
• In so far as force is "managed" within the SAPS the focus is almost
exclusively on the use of firearms. Little attention is given to issues relating
to LTL or intermediate force through processes of review or any other
organisational process other than in basic training.
Need for development of the legislative and policy framework
As indicated in Chapter 5, Section 1 limited progress has been made in the process
of amending legislation relating to the use of lethal force in affecting arrest. The
current position is indefensible in relation to Constitutional provisions and the
commitment to HUman Rights standards as well as from the point of view of a
commitment to,protecting human life. Furthermore the current lack of clarity can
be of little benefit to the police in understanding how to act in situations of the use
of force. In this respect it is worthwhile to bear inmind Geller and Scott's remark
that "marked decreases in shootings by the police" which have followed the
introduction in the US of more restrictive shooting policies appear also to have
been associated with
"increases in the proportion of the shootings that are responsive to serious
criminal activity, greater or unchanged officer safety, and no resultant
arl"erse impact on crime levels or arrest aggressiveness". (1991; p. 465,
italics added)
83 TIm word policy as used here means "the general standard that guides relevant conduct in an
agency annfrom which subordinate rules and procedures arc ultimately derived" (Klockars, 1996,
at endnote 11).
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Recommendation 2: A.'1 amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act
which clearly defines the circumstances inwhich the use oflethal force is justified,
and which broadly upholds a "defence of life and against serious injury" standard
should be formulated and passed as a matter of urgency.
Furthermore the SAPS lacks a clear and accessible statement which articulates
organisational values or policy in relation to the use of force.
Recommendation 3: The SAPS should develop a statement of policy relating to
the use of force which encourages or directs members to:
.. Protect and value human life;
.. Conduct their duties in a manner which seeks to avoid the use of force;
<> Where it is necessary, to use force effectively according to the principles
of minimum force.
Furthermore there is a generalised expectation that SAPS members will "place.
themselves on duty" at any time of the day or night when they encounter criminal
activity while they are off duty. As far as could be ascertained this expectation is
however not defined anywhere and is not addressed through any process concerned
with the management of the use of force. This expectation has a number of
undesired consequences including DO doubt contributing to the stress which SAPS
members are exposed to, sometimes contributing to foolhardy action on the part
of SAPS members, and feeding into the need for them to be armed while off duty
which itself feeds into attacks on SAPS members as well as other undesired
consequences.
Recommendation 4: The SAPS should defme in policy the responsibilities of
members when off duty and issues relating to "placing themselves on duty". The
option should be considered that while off-duty SAPS members should have the
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same legal obligations as other members of the public. As should be the case with
all members of the public responsible and civic minded attitudes sl' Je
encouraged.
Other issues which have implications for the legal and policy framework are raised
in what follows.
Systems of review of individual in cider if the use of force
The present system of the review of shooting incidents has positive benefits in
terms of serving as a mechanism of control over the use of fucauns by SAPS
members. At present it is not at all clear however to what degree this system is
consistently followed and this issue should be evaluated (see Recommendation 1).
However it is also apparent that the system has limited value as a mechanism for
evaluating incidents of the use of force by members of the SAPS. This is most
obviously because issues of the skilful handling of situations of the potential use
of force, in relation to considerations of officer sa.ety, avoiding unnecessary uses
of force, and the effective handling of such situations are never addressed.
Recommendation 5: A syst nn of incident investigation should be developed and
implemented which is intended to address issues of skill relating to the handling
of potential use of force situations. In developing such a system attention could be
paid both to the model currently in use within the POP as well as that put forward
by Klockars (1996). While there are issues which would need to be addressed in
refining and implementing such a systems it can in general be assumed that such
a system of incident investigation would come into play other than when a finding
is made that a member deliberately violated the law. Furthermore this system
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should potentially not only be applied in relation to situations of the use of force
involving firearms. 84
It is likely that efforts to implement such a system will be met by some level of
distrust from members of the SAPS particularly if they are concerned that any
frank disclosures by them will result in criminal or other legal liability . (See the
discussion of issues relating to police cooperation with S) 251 investigations at the
end of Chapter 5, Section 8). Effectively such distrust may virtually eliminate any
possibility that such a system will have any beneficial impact. This dynamic has
been recognised recently in the US where a national data collection system relating
to the use of force by police, which relies on self-reporting by individual officers,
is declared in terms of legislation to be "immune from legal process". The
legislation specifies that data identifiable to an individual shall not be "used for any
purpose in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding" (quoted in Garner
and Maxwell, 1999, ;J. 27).
Recommendation 6: Legislation should provide that the content of reports
compiled in terms of the aforesaid system of incident investigation cannot be used
in legal or disciplinary proceedings against the member(s) whose actions are the
subject of such investigation.
In order tor the SAPS to develop a culture which supports members in seeking to
avoid unnecessary uses of force managers and others should recognise and affirm
examples of good practise in avoiding the usc of force along with oiner aspects of
policing which are worthy of commendation.
84 There may also be value in evaluating SO 251 in relation to whether it meets the needs which it
is intended to serve.
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Recommendation 7: SAPS systems for recognising and rewarding policing
excellence should be extended to address the issue of excellence in minimising and
reducing the need for force to be used.
The management and use of firearms
It is apparent that the current system, in terms of which virtually all members are
issued with firearms either in terms of the 108 or station issue system, is something
of an anachronism which cannot stand up to scrutiny particularly in terms of
current knowledge about the risks associated with firearm possession. The system
is associated with a number of problems including high levels of suicides by SAPS
members, unlawful and unjustified killings and other shootings by SAPS members
while off duty, other undesirable behaviour including the use of firearms for the
purpose of intimidating persons including family members, as well as creating a
motivation for, and escalating levels of violence in, attacks on police officers. On
balance it appears reasonable to argue that the undesirable consequences associated
with 'he current state of affairs outweigh any beneficial consequences that may
arise from it either for SAPS members or South African society.
Recommendation 8: Alternatives to the 108 and station issue system should
urgently be explored. The preferable position which should be adopted should be
one where the "default" assumption is that individual police officers should not be
provided with service weapons off duty unless this is clearly rnotivated for.
Furthermore issues concerning the ownership of private firearms by SAPS
members may have to be addressed as well. In addressing the issue the fact that
it is in some ways a "sensitive issue" in police circles should also be taken into
account. The process of identifying alternatives should take into account the
concerns of, and seek to involve, SAPS members at all levels.
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One of the responsibilities of police managers, particularly at station and unit level,
is to enforce a rigorous system relating to issuing of firearms to SAPS members.
This should apply under the present 108 and statio'. issue system as well as if the
system whereby firearms are issued is changed. Two key, and to some extent
overlapping, considerations which need to be addressed in managing the issuing
of firearms to members are risk behaviour and risk factors (discussed further
below) and legal standards relating to firearm ownership and possession.
Addressing the issue goes beyond simple enforcement of the law but the minimum
standard is that firearm related legislation also needs to be enforced in relation to
members of the SAPS. Where members are declared unfit to possess firearms this
will have implications for their careers in the police service.
Recommendation 9: Standing Orders should provide guidelines relating to
circumstances where SAPS members should be denied access to firearms either on
a temporary or permanent basis. These guidelines should taken into account risk
behaviour and risk factors and legal standards. The guidelines should also identify
procedures which should be followed in evaluating whether to re-issue firearms to
SAPS members.
Issues relating to Less than Lethal Force and tactics intended to minimise levels
of violence
One of the characteristics of the management of the use of force within the SAPS
is that those systems which do exist and are functioning, are focussed
overwhelmingly on the use of firearms. Some of the recommendations made thus
far have implications for the use ofless than lethal force as well as for lethal force.
However what needs in general to be promoted is a greater emphasis on weapons
and skills which will enable police officers to minimise the need for force to be
used while carrying out their work effectively.
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Recommendation 10: The present situation whereby most members do not have
access to the tonfa or other intermediate weapon (this conclusion needs to be
confirmed) limits their capacity to use force effectively in situations where this is
necessary, increases their vulnerability, and increases reliance on lethal force. It
needs to be recognised as a serious problem and measures put in place to address
®
it.
In service training systems
There are problems with the provision of in-service (refresher and skills
development) training. Furthermore such training, in so far as it is provided,
appears to be constituted primarily by firearm training and lectures regarding legal
developments. While it is recognised that resources are limited and there are also
difficulties associated with the availability of personnel for training, the provision
of ongoing training to members, is a necessity for effective policing.
Recommendation 11: The SAPS should set minimum standards relating to in-
u
service (refresher) training, and put in place systems to ensure that these standards
are met. Inter alia this in service training should focus on intermediate weapons
(currently the tonfa), weaponless tactics, issues of skill in avoiding the use of
force, and other relevant issues, in addition to firearm training. Issues of
prioritisation, for instance in relation to providing training to police members
based in areas where policing requires higher levels of the use of force, should also
be addressed properly.
Other equipment
It should be noted that some interviewees mentioned shortages of two way radios
and bullet proof vests and that the availability of these types of equipment has
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implications for police effectiveness, officer safety and also the ability to minimise
the need for force to be used.
Identification of risk behaviour and factors
The SAPS suicide prevention programme has drawn attention to the need to
identify suicide risk behaviour in order to prevent suicides. Within the SAPS there
is also to some extent a practise of taking precautionary steps where members
demonstrate behaviour which suggests either that they may not be capable of
coping with certain work related situations or may pose a risk to themselves or
other people. However it appears that there is room for improving approaches to
the identitication of risk behaviour as well as for developing guidelines and
publicising good practise in this regard.
Recommendation 12: Risk behaviour should be understood as behaviour which
may indicate that the member potentially poses a danger to him or herself or others
or is unsuited to coping with aspects of the occupational role. It should therefore
be understood to include suicide risk behaviour and violence risk behaviour and
recognise the connection between these different behaviours. Violence risk
behaviour may include threatening or aggressive behaviour in domestic
circumstances as well as behaviour which suggests an over reliance on the use of
force in occupational circumstances.
Recommendation 13: The issue of identifying members who pose a suicide risk,
appear to pose a threat to intimates or others while off duty, or appear to be
disposed to violence, should be recognised as an important management
responsibility. Systems should be identified and put in place whereby managers loan
fulfil this responsibility. Improvements of systems tor identifying risk behaviour
may include improvement and/or better use of systems for trend identification.
144
There is some level of experienc 1relation to the operation of systems of trend
identification and this should experience should be shared more broadly.
Furthermore attention should be given to evaluating these systems with a view to
bringing about improvements. It may also include taking steps to involve
colleagues, family members and others in assisting managers to identify such
behaviour.
Recommendation 14: Support services can potentially strengthen their proactive
roJe in assisting members to address underlying problems which are manifested in
behaviour.
A credible and effective system for the reception and investigation of complaints
While interviewees stressed that, for instance, "if a person wants to open a case
[against a member] we can't stop him" where members of the public attempt to
open such cases, police members may often take steps to discourage this, if not by
direct intimidation, than by for instance making such complainants wait for
extended periods in the charge office. Even where this is not the case members of
the public would generally be intimidated by the prospect of going to a police
station to place charges against an SAPS member. However it is unrealistic to
expect the leD to be the agency which receives the vast majority of complaints
from members of the public. In particular the lCD only has provincial offices and
therefore cannot offer an accessible (in the sense of being geographically
dispersed) complaints reception system (see Criminal Justice Policy Unit, 1999).85
85 Tile Criminal Justice Policy Unit (1999) document pro-vides a number of recommendations
relating to clarifying the role of the rCD. Notably in relation to the use of force by the police it
recommends that obligation of the rCD to investigate all deaths in police custody or us a result
of police action should be maintained but that the rCD's obligation should be to conduct a
preliminary investigation following which it may decide to investigate further or to instruct tile
SAPS to take further investigative steps.
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Recommendation 15: The SAPS should establish complaints reception offices at
Area level which operate independently of stations and specialised unit. Steps
should be taken to build public trust in the integrity of this system.
Recommendation 16: These measures should be combined with steps at the
policy level to provide greater clarity in relation to questions about the reception
and investigation of complaints against the police, the investigation of police crime
and misconduct more generally, and the role of the reD.
The strengths and weaknesses of the police internal disciplinary and investigative
system have not been examined in detail in this report. In general they would
appear to be associated with difficulties associated with operationalising the new
disciplinary framework (Newham,1999). In particular it would appear that the
internal investigative system is something of a neglected area and that there is
probably scope for intr cntions to be made aimed at improving its effectiveness.
Furthermore, due to the close working relationship which they have with the police
public prosecutors are far from the ideal persons for the findings of investigations
which may impucate police members to be submitted to.
Recommendation 17: Further attention should be paid to improving the
effectiveness of police internal inves. '("T"ltiveunits and the internal investigative
system generally.
Recommendation 18: Emphasis should be placed on ensurii g the credibility and
integrity of the system for prosecutorial scrutiny of dockets relating to alleged
police criminality
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Other area oj concern
While management systems can address a range of issues relating to the use of
force at the end of the day these issues cann, "e addressed properly unless SAPS
members have the basic levels of physical and mental fitness to deal with the
demands of potential use of force situations.
Recommendation 19: Emphasis should be placed all developing a culture of
personal responsibility for basic physical and mental health and fitness amongst
members. Members in the SAPS should have a personal obligation to maintain
basic levels of physical fitness and be able to demonstrate that they are attending
to this matter.
Finally systems which are put in place to deal with the risks which police officers
are exposed tL should deal with these issues directly rather than, as is the current
situation, IIIways that have few beneficial consequences.
Recommendation 20: The current system by which SAPS members serving in
"red" (more dangerous) areas receive a pay supplement should be dispensed with
and resources should be channelled to improving equipment, in service training,
and review and support systems in these areas.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
Review as a mechanism of learning
South Africa's current situation of high crirre undoubtedly places major demands
on members of the police servir= i" terms of the use of force. Systems intended to
ensure discipline and restra 'ie use of force within the police are often
primarily punitive in nature. 'they thus feed into a culture which discourages self
criticism within the police organisation. As ...consequence the police culture is
shaped by influences amongst the rank and file', -hich are resistant to learning and
criticism.
The interest in auministrative review is then an interest in building mechanisms
into the police which serve to promote a culture of learning, self analysis and self
criticism within the police organisation. However the culture of silence within
police organisations may inhibit the potential for the implementation of such
mechanisms. According to a Human Rights Watch report which examined police
brutality in 14 US cities, for instance:
"In each city we examined, internal affairs units too often conducted
substandard invest', uions, sustained few allegations of excessive force,
and failed to identify and punish officers against whom repeated complaints
had been filed. Rather, they, in practice, often shielded officers who
committed human rights violations from exposure and guaranteed them
immunity from disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecutions" (1998, p.
5)
What this reflects is a culture within police services which condones the abuse of
the capacity to use force and in many ways supports it as functional to achieving
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the objectives of the police. At the satne time police modify their behaviour insuch
a way as to avoid external criticism. As a consequence what may emerge is an
attitude that" anything goes" as long as it is not likely to incur such criticism. One
consequence is that initiatives intended to restrain abuses by the police, such as
mechanisms of external oversight and accountability, are undermined, or prove to
have unpredicted consequences, a reflection of the resilience of the police culture.
"[A] police department's "culture" reflects what the department believes in
as an organisation. The department's recruiting and selecting practises,
policies and procedures, training and development, and ultimately, the
actions of its officers in delivering services reflect these beliefs. Clearly all
police departments have a culture. The key question is whether or not the
department has carefully developed that culture or simply allowed it to
develop without benetit of thought" (US Department of Justice, cited in
Major City Chief Administrators, 1991, p. 59).
Particularly where they are involved in the use of firearms police officers take
other peoples lives in their hands and it is appropriate that issues of legality should
be evaluated in examining such incidents. But the evaluation of use of force
incidents should not be restricted to this type of enquiry. Where members of the
SAPS are involved in use of force incidents, particularly where these involve the
use of firearms, and whether the basic evidence at hand indicates that there was not
deliberate foul play on the par! of the- police officer mechanism of review which
promote learning in the police organisation may feed into the growth of skill. Such
learning and such skill may contribute to:
• Improving the safety of SAPS members;
• Improving the capacity of members of the SAPS to use force in situations
where this is appropriate; and
• Preventing and reducing unnecessary force.
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The emphasis of current mechanisms on behaviour which may incur a punitive
response makes them in some ways incompatible with process of learning which
police officers can unreservedly engage in. In particular members of the SAPS
who believe that their actions may incur a punitive response may refuse to answer
questions which are put to them on the grounds that they have a right to remain
silent in terms of the Constitution. The potential for the development of such
mechanisms may therefore depend on whether members who actively and willingly
cooperate with them are able to do so without fear of sanction.
Towards professional policing
In addition to motivating for the improvement of systems of review this report
motivates for a number of issues to be addressed. These include:
a Development of the legislative and policy framework;
• Addressing issues relating to the management and use of firearms
• Ensuring access of SAPS members to non-lethal weapons and other
measures aimed at assisting them to use force effectively and minimise
levels of violence;
Defining risk behaviour in broader terms and improving systems aimed at
identifying and engaging with it;
a Improving systems for the reception of complaints and internal
investigative systems.
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In the current period the SAPS is facing intense pressure to improve its
performance in tackling the crime problem. In these circumstances the temptation
is to tum a blind eye to the police in relation to their use of force. But failing to
restrain the brutal elements in the police service does not ultimately serve any
constructive interest. It does not serve the cause of democracy, it does not serve
the community or to build police-community relations, and it does not serve the
objective of establishing a respected and professional police service.
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APPENDIXl: Terms for evaluating use of force incidents
Term Characteristic of Legality Relationship to
- Relationship to use of force/ occupational role
professional violent act
policing
Professional use of A use of force - the Lawful Professional
force police officer uses policing.
high standards of
professional
judgement in
evaluating the
situation and uses
force accordingly.
Unnecessary force - A use of force - the In general falls Attempts to fulfil
A highly skilled police officers act is within law. police role
police ofticer would well intentioned but "Borderline" cases effectively and
have evaluated the lacks professional may be judged by a lawfully but falls
SItuation differently judgement and! or court to be short of standards of
and/or acted skill. (Lack of criminally negligent ltighly professional
differently therby professional and thus unlawful. policing
avoiding the use of judgement or skill
force. Excessive may also result in a
force in terms of police officer using
professional less force than
standard. would have been
appropriate.)
Police brutality - An act of violence - Criminal. Abuse of police
not necessarily the police officers power in course of
lacking in technical act is criminally police duties - may
skill but contradicts negligent or a be connected to
ethics of tleliberate violation misguided
professional of the law which zealousness or
policing. Excessive occurs in the corrupt motives
force in terms of fulfilment of police connected for
legal standard. duties example to
individual gain.
Non-occupational An act of violence - Criminal. Not directly
violence - amounts the police officers connected to
to ordinary act is a criminally fulfilment of the
criminal act negligent or police role.
deliberate violation However e.g.
of the law which possession of service
occurs in weapon may be a
circumstances net contributing factor.
related to the police
role.
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APPENDIX 2: Interviews :onducted
- -~
No Date of Description (position in SAPS) Organisation
interview level
1 36327 Recently resigned former SAP and SAPS 3
member (14 years experience in SAPS)
2 36328 SAPS Station Commander 2
3 36331 Representative of SAPS P .chologlcal 1
Services, National Head Office ._-_.
4 36355 Represenative of SAPS Training Division, 1
National Head Office.
5 36543 Representative of SAPS Negative Discipine 1
Section, Personnel Division, National Head
Office.
6 36549 Representative of the National Multi- 1
Disciplinary Committee on the attacks on
and murders of members of the SAPS
7 36549 Representative of Public Order Police, 1
Development Services --
8 36549 Representative of SAPS Research Centre, 1
Division Management Services.
9 36555 Head of a reaction Unit , 2.
I
10 1&811/00 SAPS Station Commander '2
11 36557 Representative of Provincial Legal Services 1
Division
12 36557 Head of Area Negative Discipline Section 2
(teleph.mic interview)
13 36558 Senior members of staff at SAPS Pretoria 1
Training College
14 36562 Head of Clf>, police station, Gaut.ng 3
15 36566 Head of Area Legal Services 2.
,~,
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APPENDIX 3: The management of the use of force in the
SAPS: Interview themes guide
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1. The Constitutional and legal fran -ework
2. General management of the SAPS and the use of force
(structures/syster 15)
- how is the SAPS "managed" - where does control lie?
- key role players at area and station level in relation to the use of force?
- what are the main "divisional" sections of the SAPS concerned with the
use of force
- proactive: . training, support, logistics? (3,4,5,6,7) - reactive: legal
services (6,7,8,9)
- integration of "reactive" with "proactive"?
3. The selection/recruitment system
4. Training - basic and in-service components
5. The system whereby firearms, other weapons and restraining devices
are procured, stored and issued to police officers
6. Support services - welfare, spiritual and psychological
7. The system of operational command in situations of potential use of
force
what are responsibilties of operational commanders/duty
officers/supervisors re: usof?
- how does this system work? (Shift commander/wykbevelvoerder/area
commander" + charge office commander)
8. Accountability and review mechanisms ( shooting incident re .)rts,
CPFs?, other)
- shooting incident reports (duty officer) - how does this system work?
- role of legal services;
- trend analysis or other systems of review - supervisory review/informal?
9. The SAPS complaints reception, internal investigative and disciplinary
systems
- People with violence problems (on or off duty), alcohol problems,
domestic problems
- Their access to firearms, issues of discipline, suspension, dismissal etc?
10. How do these stru~tures and systems contribute to:
(a) Forming the values of the SAPS - what are the "values"of the SAPS
(particularly relating to the use of force)? how are they conveyed? (What
are values of SA society?)
(b) Managing the use of force - in terms of effectiveness and avoiding
unnecessary force?
(c) Preveuting the murder (victimisation) of police officers?
(d) Dealing with problems associated with off-duty firearm use (murder
by/of, suicide, accidents)
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APPENDIX 4: E-mail survey sent to Area Commissioners
offices.
I. Are copies of all shooting incident reports from stations in your area
submitted to your oftlee?
2. How are shooting incident reports dealt with at the Area office? Does your
office have a system for keeping records of shooting incidents? What is this
system? Does someone review them? Who, if anyone, has the responsibility of
reviewing them (i.e what is the persons position or title)?
3. Would there be- circumstances where issues relating to particular shootings
would be taken up with someone outside your office? Who, if anyone (outside of
the Area Cornm office) might this be? In what circumstances would this occur?
4. In what circumstances are steps taken to "follow up" on shooting incident
reports? What form does this "follow-up" take?
5. Apart from steps taken to deal with individual shooting incident reports does
your office ever look at trends in shooting incidents (e.g. to identify stations with
high shooting levels, comparing one year to another)? If the answer is positive
please describe steps that are taken.
6. Are shooting incident reports ever analysed from the point of view of
identifying members who appear to be involved in a particular high number of
shootings? If the answer is positive, what steps are taken in this regard?
7. Is information on complaints against members of the SAPS ever analysed in
your area in order to identify trends including members who appear to have a
particularly high number of complaints lodged against them? Please describe any
steps that are taken in this regard.
S. What is the standard procedure for your oftice in terms of dealing with
allegations of members who have misused their firearms while off-duty?
9. What do you see as the main responsibility of your office in terms of the
management of the use of force?
10. Would you say that your office tries to send out any particular message to
members in your area in relation to the use of force? What is this message?
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APPENDIX 6: Issues for further research
1. Factors impacting use of force by police and patter .1S of police
victimisation including for iastance issues of diversity including e.g. race,
culture, gender etc.
2. SAPS systems for rewarding outstanding service and their implications in
relation to issues of the use of force.
3. The operation of the system of incentive.'>for members working in high risk
areas (red areas) - all officers working there get R300 per month.
4. Medical aid systems in relation to police officers suffering medical or
psychological consequences of exposure to violence.
5. Disability grants and other issues relating to the position of police officers
disabled as a result of the use of force;
6. Provision of medical treatment for persons injured as a result of police use
of force.
7. Bereavement - how the SAPS deals with circumstances of death including
that of police officers and that of persons killed by members of the SAPS.
8 Prevention of violence in custody - searching those coming into custody
(weapons), restraint of violent persons.
9. Exteranl structures or systems impacting on the use ()f force.
10. Other internal systems, such as for instance the Logistics Section or the
Inspectorate.
11. Communications within the SAPS including the role played by the
magazine Servamus and other media in relation to issues of values and
others concerned with the management of the use of force.
12. SAPS systems for external communications and media relations and their
role in dealing with issues concerning the use of force including high
profile incidents of a "scandalous" nature.
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